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FOREWORD
The papers collected here represent the Strategic
Studies Institute’s (SSI) continuing activity to foster
dialogue on topical issues in international security
among experts from the United States and abroad.
These papers are taken from the conference that SSI
conducted on January 25-26, 2010, entitled, “Contemporary Issues in International Security,” at the Finnish embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second
conference that SSI organized, bringing together U.S.,
Russian, and European experts to discuss important
questions in contemporary world affairs.
We hope to continue these conferences on an annual basis because of the importance of such dialogue
among experts and governments. But rather than publishing the papers as a book, which we did in 2009, SSI
has decided to publish them on a panel-by-panel basis.
This particular collection is devoted to the question of
civil-military relations in Russia, a topic of profound
significance for both domestic and foreign policies in
Russia.
We hope that the succeeding collections of papers
on topics of equal importance will similarly contribute
to improved mutual understanding and ongoing dialogue regarding the great questions of world affairs.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) organized a conference entitled, “Contemporary issues in International Security,” at the Finnish embassy
in Washington, DC. This was the second in what we
hope will be annual conferences bringing together U.S.,
European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss
such issues in an open forum. The importance of such
regular dialogues among experts is well known, and the
benefits of these discussions are considerable. Just as
we published the papers of the 2008 conference in 2009,
(Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security
Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 2009), we are doing so now. However, in this case, we are publishing the papers on a panelby-panel basis.
The panel presented here was devoted to civil-military relations in Russia. This is, as the papers included
here show, a critical topic in understanding the domestic
and foreign policy trajectories of the Russian state. The
papers provided here do not deny that civilian control
exists. But they both show how highly undemocratic,
and even dangerous, is the absence of those democratic
controls over the military and the police forces in Russia which, taken together, comprise multiple militaries.
These papers present differing U.S. and European assessments of the problems connected with civilian and
democratic controls over the possessors of force in the
Russian state and should stimulate further reflection
upon these issues and those related to them.

		
		

Stephen J. Blank
Editor
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CHAPTER 1
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND RUSSIAN
SECURITY
Stephen J. Blank
INTRODUCTION
The best recent scholarship on Russian civil-military relations explicitly addresses this issue’s importance for both domestic and external security. Thomas
Gomart has written that,
Through the civil-military relationship the nature of
a state’s politico-strategic project can be assessed, that
is, what is its understanding of the world; what resources does it have available, what is its willingness
to modify its international environment. Studying the
civil-military relationship also makes clear current
modes of power, the sharing of responsibility in security matters, and in certain cases the will to act.1

Similarly, Zoltan Barany writes that,
The reform of the armed forces is closely connected,
through the broader issues of civil-military relations,
to the general state of Russia’s democratization. The
politics of defense reform is at the core of Russia’s
democratization given the crucial role the military establishment has played throughout Russian history,
including the more than seven decades of Communist
rule during which the Soviet Union had built a great
military empire.2

Thus an inquiry into the present state of those relations under conditions of defense reform and the cur-
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rent international situation is of immense analytical
and policy relevance for both domestic and external
security in Russia. Recent papers by this author and
Dale Herspring have shown that while the Russian regime is serious about military reform, it is encountering severe objections from the uniformed military; and
that second, the military has successfully persuaded
the government to accept its expansive concept of the
threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment.3
That threat assessment is one that postulates growing military threats from without, mainly from the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an increased likelihood of the incidence
of war, and, in general, a presupposition of political,
if not military, conflict with the West that preserves
the state of siege in world politics inaugurated by
Vladimir Lenin. Moreover, this threat assessment also
postulates increasing domestic threats to the security
of the present political order and links those threats,
as would a Leninist approach, to the same external
adversaries, if not enemies, postulated in the external
threat assessment. Yet despite this structural militarization of Russia’s cognitive and policy approach
to its security dilemmas, the military has only partly
succeeded in convincing the government to accept its
answers to these dilemmas. Those answers essentially
entail returning to a form of mobilization even though
defense spending, in a bow to the military, will reach
unprecedented levels in 2010 despite the current economic crisis.4
This situation of inflated threat assessments leading to pro-military policy outcomes, even if they are
only partially what the armed forces want, is a direct
result of the enduring failure to establish democratic
controls over the armed forces and the 18-year hiatus
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in defense reform since Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency in 1991. The implications for both domestic and
external security policies are quite obvious. The constancy of such threat inflation and accusations of the
West is another example of the consistent and clearly
deliberate disinformation of the Russian government
by its military and intelligence agencies, which is a
fundamental outgrowth of the failure to control these
agencies after 1991 by civilian and democratic means.
As Pavel Felgenhauer, a leading defense correspondent, reports,
Russia has a Prussian-style all-powerful General
Staff that controls all the different armed services
and is more or less independent of outside political constraints. Russian military intelligence—GRU,
as big in size as the former KGB and spread over all
continents—is an integral part of the General Staff.
Through GRU, the General Staff controls the supply
of vital information to all other decision-makers in all
matters concerning defense procurement, threat assessment, and so on. High-ranking former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times the General Staff
used the GRU to grossly, deliberately, and constantly
mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity of the military threat posed by the West in order
to help inflate military expenditure. There are serious
indications that at present the same foul practice is
continuing.5

Similarly, in 2007 President Vladimir Putin told
a press conference of Group of Eight (G-8) reporters
that Russia and the West were returning to the Cold
War, and added that,
Of course we will return to those times. And it is clear
that if part of the United States’ nuclear capability is
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situated in Europe and that our military experts consider that they represent a potential threat then we
will have to take appropriate retaliatory steps. What
steps? Of course we must have new targets in Europe.
And determining precisely which means will be used
to destroy the installations that our experts believe
represent a potential threat for the Russian Federation
is a matter of technology. Ballistic or cruise missiles or
a completely new system. I repeat that it is a matter of
technology.6

In other words, if the armed forces say something is
a threat, it is, regardless of an objective determination
of the merits of the case. Obviously under conditions of
autocracy, this is an invitation to the aforementioned
militarization of security policy and a posture based
on the presupposition of conflict. Consequently, it is
not surprising that analysts of the regime have noted
its propensity for conflict. As Andrei Illarionov writes,
Since its outset, the Siloviki regime has been aggressive. At first, it focused on actively destroying centers
of independent political, civil, and economic life within Russia. Upon achieving those goals, the regime’s
aggressive behavior turned outward beyond Russia’s
borders. At least since the assassination of the former
Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Doha,
Qatar, on February 14, 2004, aggressive behavior by
SI [Siloviki] in the international arena has become the
rule rather than the exception. Over the last 5 years, the
regime has waged 10 different “wars” (most of them
involving propaganda, intelligence operations, and
economic coercion rather than open military force)
against neighbors and other foreign nations. The most
recent targets have included Ukraine [subjected to a
“second gas war” in early 2009], The United States
[subjected to a years-long campaign to rouse antiAmerican sentiment], and, most notoriously, Georgia
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[actually bombed and invaded in 2008]. In addition to
their internal psychological need to wage aggressive
wars, a rational motive is also driving the Siloviki to
resort to conflict. War furnishes the best opportunities
to distract domestic public opinion and destroy the
remnants of the political and intellectual opposition
within Russia itself. An undemocratic regime worried
about the prospect of domestic economic social and
political crises—such as those that now haunt Russia
amid recession and falling oil prices—is likely to be
pondering further acts of aggression. The note I end
on, therefore, is a gloomy one: To me the probability
that Siloviki Incorporated will be launching new wars
seems alarmingly high.7 (italics in original)

Illarionov’s so-called wars also include “nonviolent” conflicts and the possibility of heightened
domestic repression using the instruments of force.
Therefore, this chapter represents an inquiry into
some of the consequences of this tense relationship for
Russia’s current domestic and external security. In this
context, we must bear in mind that despite genuine reform, and even possibly because of it, the pathologies
of Russia’s civil-military relations have not yet been
addressed, let alone overcome.
The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 reminded us that
we neglect developments in Russian defense policy
and overall military organization, to include the forces of the Ministry of Interior (VVMVD) and the intelligence services, at our peril. Two points stand out here.
First, based on what we have already stated above, as
a result of this war we should understand that we and
Eurasia now live in a condition of permanent threat
because Russian leaders are disposed towards the use
of force under deliberately manufactured threat scenarios of constant ideological, information, and political, if not military threats of ideological and political
war emanating from the West.8
5

Second, we cannot and are not arguing that Putin
caused this war merely to retain his power and that of
the structures of power (Silovye Struktury). The wellknown geopolitical considerations that emerged before, during, and after combat operations cannot simply be called an appendage to the war. However, this
crisis and war were clearly planned well in advance,
and the provocation of Georgia was probably staged in
such a way as to compel President Dmitri Medvedev,
the sole person capable of legally authorizing force,
to go beyond his initial support for a peace enforcement cooperation confined to South Ossetia to invade
Georgia and detach its rebellious provinces from it.9
Once the war began, it was clear that Putin took the
leadership position from the first, not relinquishing
the leadership until it became too obvious that he was
usurping power. But few believe he has relinquished
or lost it since the outbreak of hostilities. In other
words, domestic considerations of primacy and place
were probably not far from the calculations of Putin
and his entourage.
Therefore we must closely follow those developments to understand more clearly current tendencies
in Russian politics and policy as a whole. Specifically,
this chapter examines issues pertaining to civil-military relations in several areas of Russian national security policies that suggest some disturbing trends for
the future. These areas are the growing sense of the
possible use of force against domestic potential opposition exacerbated by the current economic crisis; the
pervasive corruption of the government and armed
forces, which manifests itself not only in an outbreak
of criminality within the government and military,
but also in key areas of defense and foreign policy like
arms sales; the potential for rivalry over defense and
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foreign policy in the so-called tandemocracy of President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin; and the recent amendments to the Law on
Defense concerning the use of Russia’s armed forces
abroad. All these phenomena have in common the fact
that they not only demonstrate the dangers of what
Medvedev has called “legal nihilism” to Russia’s own
security (and that of its partners and neighbors), but
also that they are grounded in the very marrow of the
Russian political system, namely this legal nihilism
and increasing authoritarianism.
In other words, it is the lack of democratic controls on the use of force at home and abroad and the
sheer unaccountability of Russia’s government when
it comes to use of those armed forces that are critical
determining factors of Russia’s political system. In
no small measure, these factors are responsible for
the fact that Russia continues to be a risk factor in international security, as Russian analysts themselves
have long known.10 Ultimately, it is Russia’s system
as much as, if not more than, any other government’s
policies towards Russia that is the fundamental problem for any analysis of Russian security. Bearing this
context in mind, close examination of certain recent
tendencies in defense and security policy reveals some
ongoing trends that should either disturb us or at least
compel close analysis of what they might portend for
the future of Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This is particularly true when we consider that Russia
is currently undergoing a major military reform, the
first real reform in years. That reform was announced
immediately after the war with Georgia and was intended to remedy many of the shortcomings revealed
by that war.

7

THE DOMESTIC SECURITY ISSUES OF
RUSSIAN DEFENSE
Not surprisingly, reform, despite its real progress, is encountering substantial opposition from the
military as well as the obstacles raised by the current
economic crisis that makes paying for it a much more
difficult proposition. There have been public demonstrations by uniformed military personnel who face
disbandment of their units, demands that Minister of
Defense Anatoly Serdyukov be fired, and visible public signs of military opposition in the media, hitherto
a rarity in Russia. This opposition itself testifies to one
dimension of the problem, the government’s record
since 1991 of encouraging of open political activity or
politicization of the armed forces.11 This opposition,
like the unrest generated by the current economic crisis, raises the possibility of large-scale manifestations
of unrest in Russia and of commensurate repression.
Indeed, some foreign analysts have opined that if
an order came to repress domestic opposition by force,
it might not be followed. Specifically, British analyst
Martin McAuley testified to Parliament that,
In order to stay in power government needs the support of security services. It is debatable if the military
would now fully support the Putin Team given the
disquiet over military reform. It might not be willing
to shoot at Russian demonstrators. There are hints that
middle FSB [Federal Security Service] officers are unhappy with the present state of affairs. In other words,
the Putin Team cannot rely on the security services
carrying out orders to use force against demonstrators.12

Similarly Vladimir Shlapentokh has written that,
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If the Communists or any other political force in Russia brought to the streets of Moscow 10,000 to 20,000
people demanding the resignation of Russian leaders,
the regime would be doomed. The notorious OMON
[Special Purpose Police Unit], a special police unit
which can easily deal with the gathering of a few hundred protesters in Moscow, would be helpless against
mass demonstrations of this size. The Kremlin is unlikely to dispatch the order to spill blood dissimilar to
the Iranian regime which did [so] recently. It is also
very likely that the police or the army would be too
afraid to obey such commands if they were issued.
Therefore the Kremlin needs to prevent any mass
protests by the opposition from happening in the first
place.13

Alternatively, if the regime lurches towards greater authoritarianism it will depend even more on the
armed forces and security services, and this, too, is a
possibility that we cannot rule out.14 That policy could
lead not only to more repression and authoritarianism
at home but also to a more aggressive foreign policy
abroad, particularly in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Given the abundant signs of regime apprehension about domestic unrest in the current economic crisis and the elaborate efforts it makes
to prevent a truly democratic election or open expression of public opinion, we can see that opportunities
for the use of force against domestic opposition of any
kind is a real prospect. Indeed, Felgengauer wrote that
the military actively sought the right to use its forces,
not the VVMVD, to quell domestic unrest should it
break out.15 Furthermore, as Barany observed, by
virtue of the failure to democratize this issue Yeltsin, Putin, and now Medvedev have created a situation whereby they now stand face-to-face with the
military, with only the instruments of personal control
9

rather than a transparent, strong, legitimate government institution that can prevent even the danger of
a coup or of internal violence.16 Indeed, arguably one
reason reform is so difficult is precisely the absence
of such institutions in Russian politics, and that until
the civil-military relationship is transformed, genuine
reform will not occur.17 There is ample evidence that
both these dangers of unrest or of heightened forcible
repression are growing, along with the authorities’
perception of the manifestation of popular unrest due
to the current economic crisis. Already in 2005-06 the
Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed Special Designation Forces from Spetsnaz brigades under the Minister’s direct control. They have air, marine, and ground
components and conduct peace-support and counter18
terrorist operations. Since the minister answers only
to the president, essentially this also means putting
all Russia under threat of counterterrorist or other socalled operations without any Parliamentary accountability or scrutiny.
Since then matters have, if anything, grown worse.
An April 2009 report outlined quite clearly the threat
perceived by the authorities. Specifically it stated that,
The Russian intelligence community is seriously worried about latent social processes capable of leading
to the beginning of civil wars and conflicts on RF
[Russian Federation] territory that can end up in a disruption of territorial integrity and the appearance of
a large number of new sovereign powers. Data of an
information “leak,” the statistics and massive number
of antigovernment actions, and official statements and
appeals of the opposition attest to this.19

This report proceeded to say that these agencies
expected massive protests in the Moscow area, industrial areas of the South Urals and Western Siberia, and
10

in the Far East, while ethnic tension among the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Volga-Ural areas is
also not excluded. The author also invoked the specter
of enraged former Army officers and soldiers, who are
now being demobilized because of the reforms, taking to the streets with their weapons. But despite the
threat of this unrest, the government is characteristically resorting to strong-arm methods to meet this
threat. In other words, it is repeating past regimes (not
the least Yeltsin’s) in strengthening the VVMVD and
now other paramilitary forces as well.20
More soberly, this report, along with other articles,
outlines the ways in which the internal armed forces
are being strengthened. Special intelligence and commando subunits to conduct preventive elimination
of opposition leaders are being established in the
VVMVD. These forces are also receiving new models
of weapons and equipment, as well as armored, artillery, naval, and air defense systems. In 2008, 5.5 billion
rubles were allocated for these forces’ modernization.
Apart from the already permitted “corporate forces”
of Gazprom and Transneft that monitor pipeline
safety, the Ministry of Interior (MVD) is also now discussing an Olimpstroi (Olympics Construction) Army,
and even the Fisheries inspectorate is going to create a
special armed subunit called Piranha.21
Since then even more information about the extent of the domestic reconstruction of the MVD into
a force intended to suppress any manifestation of dissent have emerged. As of 2003, there were 98 specialpurpose police detachments (OMONs) in Russia. By
comparison in 1988 during the crisis of the regime and
its elites under Gorbachev, 19 OMONs were created
in 14 Russian regions and three union republics. By
2007, there were already 121 OMON units comprising 20,000 men operating in Russia. Moreover, by
11

2007 there were another 87 police special designation
detachments (OMSNs), with permanent staffing of
over 5,200 people operating with the internal affairs
organs, making a grand total of 208 special purpose or
designated units with 25,000 well-trained and drilled
soldiers. The OMSVs have grown from an anti-crime
and anti-terrorist force to a force charged with stopping “extremist” criminal activity. All these units train
together and have been centralized within the MVD
to fight “organized crime, terrorism, and extremism.”
From 2005 to 2006, the financing of these units was
almost doubled. By 2009, they were also working with
aircraft assets, specifically the MVD’s own Aviation
Center with nine special purpose air detachments
throughout Russia. Seven more such units are to be
created. Furthermore, the MVD has developed a concept for rapidly airlifting these forces to troubled areas
from other regions when necessary. These forces are
also receiving large-scale deliveries of new armored
vehicles with computers in some cases and command,
control, and communications (C3) capabilities. Since
these are forces apart from the regular VVMVD, “On
a parallel basis with the OMON empire, a multi-level
internal security troop machine is being developedwith its own special forces, aircraft, armored equipment, situational crisis centers, and so forth.”22 When
one considers this huge expansion of the domestic
Silovye Struktury (power organs), it becomes clear
why already in 2008 Russia announced that it would
increase funding for the Ministry of Interior by 50 percent in 2010 and where the government’s estimation
of the true threat to Russian security lies.23
Equally, if not more importantly, the quality, reliability, and extent of professionalism of the armed
forces, as well as their responsiveness to civilian authority are crucial issues in Russia’s defense and for12

eign policy. Since the Russian government is a highly
autocratic one with little or no accountability of the
Executive to anyone at home and is conducting an
aggressive global foreign policy, these facts make the
nature of the defense forces and defense policy a matter of urgent international and national interest. As
McAuley concludes,
The war in the Caucasus proves that Russian international behavior for the most part is decided by circles,
which wittingly provokes Russia’s defiant and aggressive international behavior with a view to restore
a mobilized economy and its privileged status in the
political system.24

However, even though the current military reform is both timely and essential if Russia is to have
a modern army capable of defending against contemporary threats, it will not be sufficient if there is no
reform of the pathetic state of civil-military relations
that could threaten the state’s integrity and stability if left unchecked. Here we should be blunt. After
the fall of Communism 19 years ago, Russia has yet
to create a system of civil-military relationships that
provides effective control of both the government and
the multiple armed forces. One result of this failure, as
I have previously argued elsewhere, is that there exists within Russian politics and not exclusively within
the armed forces, a constant temptation to use military
force for the solution of problems that require a political resolution.25 The second result of this enduring failure is no less and perhaps even more serious, namely
the permanent tension, if not crisis, in civil-military
relations is part of a larger and enduring crisis of the
state. This tension, if not crisis, colors many if not all
of Russia’s security policies.
13

CORRUPTION AND CRIMINALITY
This second result is particularly visible if we take a
broader and deeper analytical account of the rampant
corruption within the multiple militaries, not to mention the state. After all, President Medvedev has made
numerous efforts to launch a campaign against official corruption and complained more than once about
what he calls Russia’s legal nihilism, a phenomenon
that is as much present in the defense and security
sector as it is elsewhere. And preliminary signs show
that despite now publicized efforts to uproot corruption and crime in the armed forces as a whole, again
to include the VVMVD, in fact, despite the reform,
the incidence of such events is rising. If this means reporting has improved, that is a welcome sign. But the
current anti-corruption campaign has yet to land any
truly big fish and in many ways reflects more the settling of clan scores atop the government machine than
a commitment to living within the law.26
Even though we have long known of the corruption, criminality, venality, and brutality towards soldiers that pervades the entire military and despite
years of publicity and promised efforts to uproot
these trends, they evidently are worsening even as serious attempts are made to reform the armed forces.
Ultimately, the pervasive corruption and criminality that we see in those forces reflect larger trends in
the society and state as a whole. These incidences of
corruption, lawlessness, criminality, and aggressiveness are profoundly significant because they can have
wide-ranging, unpredictable, and even dangerous
consequences for Russia and its overall policy, both
domestic and foreign, that can add considerably to the
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already considerable number of security challenges
that Russia both presents to the United States and that
it also perceives. For example, it should be noted that
when the Spanish police broke open a Russian Mafia
mob in Spain in 2008, it turned out that the “Capos”
of the Russian Mafia there were closely and personally tied to some of the highest ranking officials in the
Russian government, e.g., winning lucrative public
works contracts. Yet they also clearly had contacts
with terrorists in the North Caucasus.27 This should
not be surprising, as by 2005 former Minister of the
Interior Anatoly Kulikov was already warning of the
criminalization of the state and the fusion of criminal
and state organizations.28
In the security sphere, this issue became prominent
as a result of the audit conducted by Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov in 2006-07. During the audit, Serdyukov discovered that corruption was even worse than
expected. For example, on April 3, 2008, the Audit
Chamber announced that more than 164.1 million
rubles had been stolen from the ministry through
fraud and outright theft. Another report stated that
the MoD “accounts for 70 percent of the budgetary
resources used for purposes other than those officially
designated.”29 But while President Putin recognized
the need for a new broom to sweep clean the Ministry
and appointed Anatoly Serdyukov to do so, it is clear
that despite Serdyukov’s best efforts, corruption continued and is still going on.
Similarly, a recent audit revealed significant violations of financial and economic activity in the Air
Force, amounting to a loss of over 660 million rubles.
These violations occurred in the use of Air Force resources and funds by officials in Air Force commands,
military units, and organizations.30 In other words,
this corruption pervaded the Air Force. And this per15

vasiveness embraces the entire armed forces as well,
not just the Air Force. Thus in 2008 Russia’s leading
defense correspondent, Alexander Golts, told a U.S.
audience that 30-50 percent of the annual defense
spending in Russia is simply stolen.31 More recently,
prosecutors uncovered mass fraud in Rosoboronzakaz
(Russian State Defense Purchasing Agency) in the
amount of 6.5 billion rubles, as well as the unlawful
spending of 1.3 billion rubles and the inappropriate
use of funds of 98 million rubles.32 From January-August 2009 alone, an investigation uncovered 1,343 violations of the law on the placement of defense orders
in Rosoboronzakaz.33 Indeed, an earlier investigation in
June by the Main Military Prosecutor’s office revealed
about 3000 violations, costing the state another 380
million rubles, leading a commentator to observe that
some these criminal schemes were notable not just for
their scope, but for their brazenness—“one gets the
impression that these persons were not afraid of anything.”34
Under the circumstances, we should not be surprised that the Russian armed forces are not receiving modern weapons (although corruption is not the
only reason for this failure). Another recent audit
revealed that, “At present the share of the modern
types of weapons and hardware that are supplied to
the Russian army and navy is not more than 6 percent.” And the situation in the high-tech sectors of the
military—ships, missiles, and space hardware—is especially difficult.35 Insofar as the defense reform’s ultimate success is predicated on the effective production
and distribution through the armed forces of modern
weapons, this failure jeopardizes the defense reform.
Likewise, in the Ministry of Interior Minister
Rashid Nurgaliyev recently gave regional law enforcement chiefs a month to clear out the corruption
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in their midst or be sacked for failure to control their
units or because they, too, are implicated in the corruption. Nurgaliyev revealed that in the first 6 months
of 2009, 274 criminal proceedings have been launched
against Ministry Chiefs at various levels, leading in
some cases to outright dismissals. In addition, the
investigation uncovered 44,000 violations by law enforcement officials, involving 2,500 crimes committed
by law enforcement agency employees.36
That aforementioned attitude of not fearing anything exemplifies the scope of the problem, even
though it is clear that there is now pressure to uncover
such cases. And the corruption of the government as
a whole in Russia needs no explication here in view of
the widely decried fact of this corruption by President
Medvedev and numerous commentators. Indeed,
these cases show that some sense of the scope of this
criminality is now becoming public as part of Medvedev’s campaign, which has been reinvigorated insofar
as the military is concerned. Arguably, Medvedev’s
failure to date to uproot this pervasive criminality is
what has led to the recent disclosures of corruption
in numerous sectors of state and military activity. For
example, in the military recent figures show that the
number of crimes committed by the military during
2008 rose by 9 percent, and the crime rate in the military was the highest among the security related agencies in Russia (this is what is in the report, and given
the notorious corruption of the police, this is a frightening claim). Military prosecutors completed investigations of 12,000 crimes and brought 80 percent of
cases to court, including 12 cases against high-ranking
military officers.37 And in the first half of 2009, military
investigators completed proceedings of 6,296 crimes,
almost 10 percent more than in 2008, while there are
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also reports of falling crime rates in the Ministry of
Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Interior.38
Nevertheless, the number of cases in this sector involving the abuse of authority for “mercenary” reasons is
increasing, as is the overall military crime rate.39
Subsequently, in July 2009, the Chief Military Prosecutor announced that crimes committed by officers
had reached “unprecedented levels.” During 2008,
officers had committed 4,159 crimes, including 1,754
corruption-related offenses, a 38 percent increase over
2007. Meanwhile, already by June 2009 they had committed over 2,000 crimes, or one in four of total crimes,
an increase of 7 percent on a year-on-year basis. While
many of these crimes involve physical assaults on
service personnel (over 5,430 personnel reporting
such assaults); one-third of the crimes involved corruption. Since 2004, the number of Russian generals
and admirals prosecuted for corruption had increased
by almost seven times.40 Official figures calculate that
these cases of corruption resulted in losses of at least
2.2 billion rubles ($78.6 million) to the state budget in
2008.41 Finally the evidence of the military forces and
its leadership’s collusion with organized crime is also
now coming to light. The U.S. Cyber Consequences
Unit recently reported to the U.S. Government that,
Denial of service and web defacement attacks launched
last year against Georgian web sites were carried out
by Russian civilians and sympathizers rather than the
government but were coordinated with the invasion
of the former Soviet state and had the cooperation of
both the Russian Army and organized crime, according to a report being released today to U.S. government officials.42
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This connection, unfortunately, is not so surprising, given the extensive reporting of the links between
major energy firms like the notorious Rosukrenergo,
a key middleman in Russo-Ukrainian gas deals, and
leading figures of Russian organized crime, and similar such links throughout Eastern Europe.43
If we assume that cases that are uncovered are
only a fraction of the sum total of criminal activity in
any organized social environment, it becomes clear
that we are witnessing the overall degradation of the
Russian military and government. It is not too much
to say, as do many European governmental analysts
and officials, that we see a criminal, if not Mafia, state
(their term).44 Indeed, no military organization is so
isolated from the state and society that its degradation
does not both imply and rebound back upon the overall degeneration of that state and society. For example,
recent investigations have uncovered figures that were
shocking, even to the Russian government, concerning the brutality and venality of the police forces and
the level of criminal violations among them.
According to the available statistics, the law enforcement [agencies] are far ahead of the other corruptionprone bodies of power. In 2008, 3,329 police were
punished for bribes, in contrast to 433 employees in
the health service and 378 in education. According to
police, 2,516 crimes committed by police and federal
migration service personnel have been identified in
January-July, including 1,600 cases of abuse of office.45

This last charge that amounts to the criminalization of the state is not as surprising as it may seem,
for Russian and foreign observers have long pointed
to the integration of criminal elements with both the
energy, intelligence, and defense industrial sectors of
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the economy and as an instrument of Russian foreign
policy in Eastern Europe.46 Accordingly, summarizing a great deal of evidence, Janusz Bugajski observes
that such criminal penetration of Central and Eastern
Europe, including the members of the CIS is a major
security concern to those governments because these
criminal networks both destabilize their host countries
and render services to political interests in Moscow.
The Russian Mafiya greatly expanded its activities
throughout the region during the 1990s and established regional networks in such illicit endeavors as
drug smuggling, money laundering, international
prostitution, and migrant trafficking. In some countries, Russian syndicates have been in competition
with local gangs, while in others they have collaborated and complemented each other. Analysts in the
region contended that Russian intelligence services
coordinated several criminal groups abroad and directed a proportion of their resources to exert economic and political influence in parts of Eastern Europe.47

Bugajski’s observations correspond to the findings
of many other researchers and East European officials
concerning the linkages among business, state, intelligence, and organized crime. Thus it has long been
known that throughout Eastern Europe and the CIS
that the Russian state, intelligence services, energy
firms, and organized crime, all collaborate together
on behalf of Russian interests. As the record shows,
they seek to gain access to legitimate business firms,
control key sectors of the economy and newsmedia,
subvert political parties, and buy political influence
and politicians throughout the region.48
Because of the fact that, as Dmitry Trenin has remarked, “Russia is governed by the people who own
it,” office and property, as in medieval times and in
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the Soviet Nomenklatura, are one and the same. Power
leads to wealth and property, and vice versa. Indeed,
it cannot be otherwise in such a system. And since this
is a system that has systematically freed the executive
from any accountability to the news media, Parliament or anyone else and therefore lacks a concept of
the rule of law or of the sanctity of contracts and private property, this outcome is hardly surprising. Recent reports in the Russian press give some indication
of the scope of the problem. Medvedev himself has
announced what everyone knew, namely that official
positions are bought and sold.49
Thus this criminality is not confined to the armed
forces or security sector, but rather it epitomizes the
way in which governing occurs throughout the state.
Indeed, Dmitri Simes and Paul Saunders recently
called it the glue that holds together the disparate
groups that constitute Russia’s governing elite.50 But
beyond that Simes, Saunders, and Russian analysts
alike point out that this pervasive corruption not only
impedes foreign and domestic investment, it solidifies
a dysfunctional political system where the elite has
little genuine concern for the national interest or capability to formulate it and is instead busy feathering its
own nest.51 As Vyacheslav Glazychev writes,
The way Russia is now run clearly reflects Putin’s personality and management style. First, there is a linear
scheme of administration, based on the idea of the
“vertical,” rather than a rule-applying bureaucracy.
Second, mutual loyalty forms the basis for selecting
one’s “team” and is combined with open contempt for
the government structure itself. Third, the principle of
unilateral command from above combines eclectically
with some elements of economic liberalism.52
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The behavior described here perfectly conforms to
this depiction of the current governing reality in both
the defense sector and throughout the state as a whole.
To overcome this sign of pervasive anomic behavior
among the security services and sector, we must also
overcome it in the state, a tall and dubious order. But
it is obvious that the continuation of such trends can
only further enfeeble the central government’s ability
to modernize Russia, let alone reform or democratize
it. Moreover, it is fraught with dangerous implications
for Russia; Russia’s internal, if not external, security;
and its armed forces.
First, this widespread criminality provides powerful disincentives to reforming the conditions that
make soldiers the easy prey of veterans and officers.
And the uprooting of such phenomena as Dedovshchina (hazing), enserfment of soldiers, theft, and violence
against them by superior officers and veterans is essential to any successful defense reform, which, after
all, aims at creating a so-called professional army. Despite the reforms to date, it is still clear that these phenomena remain and pose a serious problem within the
armed forces. Indeed, the reforms during the first 6
months of 2009 did not lead to a reduction in the incidence of crime or corruption within the armed forces.
If anything, these manifestations increased.53 This is
not only a question of crime and corruption but of
hazing and violence, including torture against soldiers
by officers, suicides, and other noncombat deaths.54
Military spokesmen suggest that this problem may
continue because even as the officer corps is downgraded, those remaining are not trained or equipped
to deal with a new army, and others may resist losing
their perquisites. Worse yet, in 2009 figures suggest
that not only is the Russian army drafting people with
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a criminal record for the first time in this decade, but
that their number amounts to more than half of those
drafted since autumn 2008.55 While the government is
now introducing chaplains for the armed forces to introduce some form of moral counseling and attempting other procedural reforms to stop this trend, if the
new army remains a home for criminals and brutes,
that will defeat the entire purpose of the reform.
More grandly, this widespread brutality and corruption lead the military leadership, much of which directly benefits from this state of affairs, to resist reforms
and create powerful obstacles to reforms that would
lead to a genuinely modern, and truly professional
army where soldiers have enforceable legal rights and
recourse against accountable colleagues and officers
rather than perpetuate the continuing treatment of enlisted men as serfs and “baptized property” (the term
coined by 19th century dissident Alexander Herzen to
describe serfs). Moscow’s earlier inability and refusal
to reform its military, end conscription, and institute
a genuinely professional military leads to an armed
force composed of the uneducated; physically, morally, and mentally unfit; and widespread brutality and
corruption, which militates against an army that can,
except for certain specialized forces, effectively use
high-tech weaponry. Under the circumstances, it is
not surprising that Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov openly admitted in 2008 that the army was not
ready for 21st century warfare.56 And this was hardly
the only set of reasons why the army was so backward
compared to contemporary requirements.
Certainly the pervasiveness of these pathologies
precludes creation of a truly professional army in
any sense of the word. This is not merely a question
of men and women being paid well for their services
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to the state, nation, and military. It also is a question
of inculcating in the armed forces the sense of professionalism, of belonging to a profession with a genuine
ethic of patriotic service. This ethic, arguably is that
of a profession not that of a bureaucracy, although in
Russia’s case, while we have the pathologies of bureaucratic procedure and an immense state, we certainly do not even have a bureaucracy in the sense of
a disinterested and nonpartisan corps of public servants. As a result, the whole notion that commanding
officers can lead the armed forces in such a way as to
inculcate this professionalism and an ethic of it among
the men under their command flies out the window.
Instead, we have an army like the one seen in Georgia
and described above by Makarov. 57
Yet at the same time, the reform has paradoxically
given a new impetus to corruption and criminality
within the armed forces that may help explain the
rise of such incidents, even as the reform is occurring.
Marc Galeotti offers the following reasons for the new
impetus towards corruption. The reform takes place
in a context of constantly rising defense appropriations, including for 2010. Much of this will go to the
reform, specifically raising salaries and professionalization, i.e., the “recruitment” of “professional” soldiers at higher rates of pay and improved conditions
and housing. Already some officers receive bonuses
that triple or quadruple their basic pay. Consequently,
officers are scrambling for bonuses and to avoid dismissal as the armed forces downsize.58
This has created massive opportunities for corruption.
Senior officers and those within the personnel directorates can demand and expect substantial bribes for
their recommendations. According to some Defense
Ministry sources, the going rate can be the equivalent
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of a full year’s salary in return for guaranteeing continued employment on the higher pay scale. Furthermore, the Defense Ministry is gearing up for a massive
campaign of refurbishing and replacing rundown barracks and other facilities. This opens up opportunities
for a wide range of money-making ventures from selling off second-hand furniture and equipment (which
is then logged as having been destroyed) to manipulating bidding by contractors to secure government
contracts.59

And the continuing insurgencies in the North Caucasus contribute greatly to this state of affairs.
If crimes by officers throughout the country in general
hold to their normal level, meaning that every fourth
criminal is an officer, then, in the 42nd Motorized Rifle
Division, which deployed to Chechnya, the situation
is much worse, with more than half the crimes in the
unit committed by the officer corps. The situation is
also bad in the Airborne Troops, the Space Troops,
the Air Force, the Volga-Urals Military District, North
Caucasus Military District, and the Moscow garrison.
There almost a third of all crimes reported last year
was committed by officers.60

Crime is not limited to lower and mid-level officers. The same source noted that “In 2004, only three
generals were tried, but in 2008, 20 were.” The bottom
line is that officer crimes are out of control. “The crime
rates are the highest over the past 10 years. Officers
are responsible for more than 2,000 crimes with onethird of these linked to corruption.”61
Thus pervasive corruption, criminality, and brutality have become major causes of Russia’s inability
to deal effectively with the mounting threats in the
North Caucasus, as they are helping to turn the lo-
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cal population away from Moscow and to the Islamic
fundamentalists who are leading the revolts against
Russian rule. Any objective account of this insurgency
cannot overlook the seriousness of the Islamic threat
and its equal levels of violence and terror against the
population.62 Nevertheless, the fact remains that every fifth incident in the Army involves servicemen
from the North Caucasus, where indeed there is no
problem recruiting soldiers. Obviously, the potential
material rewards of service plus the martial traditions
of the region are attractive to local men, especially as
this remains the poorest region of Russia. Indeed, men
are now bribing recruiters to get into the service in an
ironic reversal of past practice that involved bribes to
be exempted.63 These soldiers bring their own culture
and a propensity for ethnic organization of parallel
discipline structures into the army, leading to violence, discipline problems, interethnic conflicts within
units, and, of course, criminality. But if the Russian
army continues to experiment with ethnic-based units,
it runs the risk of intensifying the problems already
discerned here.64
In the case of the Caucasus, there are already abundant reports that Russian armed forces, (it is unclear
if this is the regular army or the VVMVD) operate as
death squads. This phenomenon is of long-standing
and grows out of the long war in Chechnya. It also
appears to be a pervasive phenomenon throughout
the North Caucasus. Such operations are particularly centered in the units of the various Special Forces
operating there and are looked on with a blind eye
by higher authorities.65 They kidnap and kill people
with seeming impunity, and Russian human rights organizations suggest that there exists a correlation between this violence and the rising tide of insurgency
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in both Chechnya in particular, and the North Caucasus as a whole.66 Aleksandr’ Cheraskov of Memorial (the organization established to preserve a living
memory of Stalin’s crimes) observed that these death
squads target young men of military age, which only
makes them more susceptible to recruitment by rebel
groups.67 And Ludmilla Alexeyeva, the head of the
Moscow Helsinki Group said,
What we see now in all these (Caucasus) republics is a
civil war between the security forces and the clandestine fighters, and between the security forces and the
local population. . . . In the end we will lose the North
Caucasus. The Russian president doesn’t wish this, of
course, but he has no control over his own security
forces.68

And that is precisely the point. After 10 years of
unsparing brutality on all sides in Chechnya, that
province, as well as its neighbors, is aflame, with no
end to these conflicts in sight. Much of this is directly
traceable to the violence and corruption of the Russian
armed forces that continually undermines the real
security of the Russian Federation and which itself
is only a partial manifestation of the larger and even
more endemic corruption and brutality of the government.
The Shamanov Affair.
The threats to the state from this degeneration of
the Russian military became painfully clear in September 2009 in what might be called the Shamanov
affair. General Vladimir Shamanov is a two-star general and commander in chief of the Russian airborne
forces (VDV). His daughter and son-in-law, Alexei
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Khramyshin, are the owners of the Sporttek business that leases commercial space out to other businesses in Moscow, and his son, Yuri, is a member of
its board. This business has clear connections to organized crime.69 Shamanov’s daughter and, especially
his son-in-law, are under investigation for organizing
an attempted murder of a businessman in 2006, and
Khramyshin is the object of an international arrest
warrant even though he remains at large. Khramyshin
is also believed to be a high-ranking member in the
Tatar crime gang.70 On August 18, 2009, upon learning
that the authorities were searching Sporttek’s office,
General Shamanov called up VDV Colonel Vadim
Pankov and ordered him to send two detachments
of VDV Special Forces to the office in Moscow and to
detain and intern the special investigator and seal the
building. Upon learning of this move, the investigator
cut short his search and left, and the troops returned
to their base. Since the call was taped as part of the
larger investigation, the tapes were released a few
weeks later, causing an uproar.71
Ironically, Shamanov has been a forceful exponent
of the defense reform, making himself a prominent
target for those who oppose it. But his misadventures
reveal all the dangers of corruption we have outlined
above. First, the investigation of Sporttek reveals the
intimate links between members of organized crime
syndicates and key military commanders. Second, it
shows Shamanov used his authority to quash an investigation or part of one of this organized crime activity.
But most dangerously, Shamanov’s actions exposed
the fiction of state control over the armed forces that
Alexeyeva warned about. Russian political authorities
have always possessed a heightened sensitivity to the
specter of Bonapartism, a coup by a general, and Sha-
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manov’s ability to order troops on his own authority
into Moscow for nonmilitary purposes without any
accountability whatsoever, raised that specter in the
most brazen and overt manner possible.72 As Felgenhauer commented about this affair, it displayed the
lack of control over the military.
The fact that paratroopers were ordered into Moscow and actually moved in without the consent (or
knowledge-author) of the Kremlin or government has
revealed a serious lack of political control. Russia is an
authoritarian state with no serious civil control over
its military. If Putin and the Putin-appointed President Dmitry Medvedev also cannot control military
movements even within Moscow, a coup in Russia
is possible. Of course, Shamanov on August 18 was
not contemplating launching a coup, but apparently
using paratroopers to defend his business interests.
However, if such things are allowed, Shamanov or another general (colonel) might in the future use Special
Forces to arrest Putin, or Medvedev, or both. Within
Moscow, a relatively small troop of determined, well
trained, and armed soldiers could do it. The radical
military reform in Russia is aimed at creating a more
modern, mobile standing armed force, and its men are
increasingly dependent on their commanders for their
well being.73

Not only does this assessment reinforce Galeotti’s
insight into why reform should make corruption flourish, it also ties together the links between organized
crime, the armed forces as a whole, their corruption,
and the possibility of a military takeover. In view of
the pervasive legal and moral nihilism of the system,
including all the security services and the politicization of the Russian military that observers have already noted in earlier studies, this affair underscores
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many of the dangers confronting Russia from its own
armed forces.74
Corruption in Arms Sales.
Any state’s arms sales policy stands at the intersection of its foreign and domestic policies because it
links the effective organization of its defense sector (a
large and critical part of the overall economy) to the
pursuit of defense and foreign policy goals. And this
is certainly the case with Russia. In this context, one of
the most dangerous aspects of the pervasive corruption discussed above is its equally pervasive presence
in arms sales. This is not merely a discussion of the use
of shadowy intermediaries and arms brokers like Viktor Bout, but rather the systematic corruption of the
topmost leaders of the government. Again, we must
reiterate that the point is not that Russia conducts socalled “black operations” abroad (many states do), but
rather that its political and military leadership has a
personal and pecuniary interest in arms sales, and that
the defense sector has long been one penetrated by organized crime and corruption that links itself to the
conduct of sensitive state policies with ensuing dangrous consequences.
The available evidence clearly suggests that these
activities are widespread and that Bout and his analogues abroad have excellent contacts with high-ranking Russian officials with responsibility in the security sphere. Such activities are also of long-standing.
In such a system, opacity, even if we were not in the
naturally secretive defense sector, is the rule, not the
exception. Accountability in this sector is limited at
best, and corruption is ubiquitous. In fact, one might
argue that corruption and criminality are rampant
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throughout the entire economy.75 Similarly, another
recent commentary observed, “In Russia corruption
is the strongest vertical structure, on which the entire
state arrangement is based.”76 Already in 2003, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev
indicated his concern at the extent of criminal penetration of defense industry and hinted that his organization might have to intervene (no doubt to take the
action away from the criminals to it and its friends).77
Indeed, as the Russian press and Russian scholars and
observers like Leonid Kosals and Vitaly Shlykov have
often observed, Russia’s defense industry is pervaded
by corruption and even criminal violence, including
forcible seizures of companies and even the murders
of executives of defense firms in the competition for
control over the rents accruing from arms sales either
to the Russian army or abroad.78
For example, Russia’s controls over the missiles
that it has sold to Syria and Iran also proved to be remarkably porous, as many of them went to Hezbollah
in 2000-06, and probably since then as well.79 And there
is good reason to believe that there is much hardware
going to dangerous states from Russia through third
parties or other unaccountable middlemen like Bout.
Already in July, 2000 Kommersant reported that,
The world community has long treated Belarus as a
sickly child, of whom few demands are made, that
had previously been exploited by Russia, which under
U.S. pressure had to abandon direct cooperation in the
military sphere with Iran. Russian military-industrial
complex output started reaching the Iranians via our
Belarusian brothers, who had few commitments to
Washington [and this was during the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement’s operation-author] Cooperation
between Minsk and Baghdad has been developing

31

rapidly of late. Official statistics confirm that Belarusian-Iraqi trade turnover in 1999 came to $6 million.
According to Kommersant’s information, that indicator was understated at least 10-fold.80

There is good reason to believe that similar machinations with regard to conventional missiles (Iskander) have continued. For example, in September 2009
Russian customs officers in Krasnodar prevented the
smuggling of spares for the MiG-29 Fighter to Syria.81
Scandals involving Ukraine’s transfer of Russian missiles have occurred and, as shown below, there is good
reason to believe that similar events are continuing insofar as Russian supplies to Syria are concerned. And
the scale of gray or black market transfers to would-be
proliferators cannot be known.
For example, the activities of international arms
brokers like Bout expose loopholes in international
agreements and conventions to which Russia and
many other states are a party. These brokers have
established networks of international arms sales that
span continents and also apply to technologies usable
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).82 Some of the
examples of corruption may be gleaned from an anlysis of Russian arms sales to Venezuela. In 2008, Bout
was arrested in Thailand as part of a sting organized
by the U.S. Government. Interestingly enough, he was
arrested for offering to deliver weapons to Colombia’s
rebel army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who are also implicated in the drug
trade. It may not be a coincidence, but Bout’s offers
coincide with what is clearly a Russian effort to inflame Latin America in a further internal and external
conflict involving Venezuelan and Ecuadorian support for the FARC against the U.S. ally, Colombia.83
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After Bout was arrested in Thailand, Moscow lobbied for his return to Russia, where he had lived freely in spite of an international warrant for his arrest.
Western analysts suspect he has close ties to Russia’s
military and intelligence forces, as Bout had admitted
carrying air shipments for the Russian state. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asked the authorities
in Bangkok to make sure the hearing was held “impartially, without politicization.” Moscow brought
immense pressure to bear upon Bangkok so that he
would not be extradited to the United States and
forced to name names, dates, places, etc.84 Moscow
also increased incentives to Thailand not to extradite
Bout. Russia sold cheap oil to Thailand last year and
is in talks to sell fighter jets. Former Director of Operations for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Michael Braun, who oversaw the operation against Mr.
Bout, told the Financial Times that he had received “a
great deal of information over the past few months
that attempts were under way by Russia to buy Bout’s
way out.” Mr. Braun, now a security consultant, added, “The last thing they wanted was for him to be on
U.S. soil where he could open up.”85 And we should
note that Bout is hardly the only international arms
broker involved in running weapons to the FARC or
to other criminal, insurgent, and terrorist groups in
Latin America.86
Undoubtedly Moscow also fully recognizes President Hugo Chavez’s conversion of Venezuela into a
critical transshipment center for narcotics from both
Latin America and West Africa, along with his support for insurgencies and terrorists throughout Latin
America. He has expansionist and revolutionary
dreams about Colombia and seeks to exploit those factors for his own anti-American purposes.87 Indeed, re-
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ports from 2003 point to Russian criminal penetration
of Mexico’s narcotics gangs.88 More recently, in early
2009 a Russian and Cuban citizen were both arrested
for drug smuggling in Yucatan.89
Apart from gaining cash for the defense sector,
these purchases make no strategic sense for Russia.
That is, unless they are intended for other purposes,
e.g., helping the FARC and other similar groups fighting in Colombia, power projection throughout Latin
America, drug running with submarines and protection of them against air attacks, or providing a temporary base for Russian naval and air forces where they
can be sheltered from attacks but threaten North or
South America.90 Russia also supports the allegedly
peaceful Venezuelan development of nuclear energy
and the discovery of uranium and thorium there.91
Iran is now actively helping Venezuela explore for
uranium.92 These developments suggest the possiblity
of Venezuela functioning as a kind of swing man or
pivot for a Russo-Venezuelan-Iranian alliance against
the United States. Certainly elements in the Iranian
press and government believe that Tehran should
further intensify its already extensive efforts to create the possibility of a “second front” in political, or
even in military, terms against the United States. Hezbollah already raises money and runs drugs in Latin
America, and many have noted the growing network
of ties between Iran and Latin American insurgents
and terrorists facilitated by Chavez.93 It is difficult to
see how this benefits Russia in any serious way other
than by simply making life difficult for Latin Americans and the United States. But as Lenin (who should
have known this) remarked, “spite, in general, plays
the very worst role in politics.”
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Iran offers an even more dangerous example of
what happens when the arms sales business beomes
enmeshed with high-level corruption leading the
criminalization of state policy. The recent incident of
the Arctic Sea, a ship that reportedly left Russia and
was suposedly hijacked by pirates in the Baltic Sea
and disappeared until the Russian Navy tracked it
down in the Cape Verde Islands, illustrates that the
cancer of corruption in the arms trade has apparently
infected Russian arms sales to Iran. More and more, it
looks like this ship was chartered to run Russian missile parts to Iran, indicating an extensive network of
corruption throughout the arms sales and military industrial complex establishments. Allegedly, the Israeli
Mossad discovered this sale and tipped off Russian
intelligence, so as not to embarrass Russia.94 But this
situation embodies the dangerous link between the
Russian arms mafia and the government, including
corrupt officials and middlemen. As an Israeli columnist wrote recently,
In modern-day Russia, there really does exist a symbiosis between the state and the weapons mafia. In
this situation, the mafia does not always have to act in
circumvention of the state machine to supply weapons to pariah states. The mafia—and this might be the
most important conclusion to be drawn from the story
of the disappearnce of the notorious freighter (Arctic
Sea-author)—can be used as a weapon for state policy.
Clearly, the Russian government will not dare use official channels today to supply missile systems to Iran.
However, when it is the mafia at work, illegally selling these systems, well, what can the government do
when it is certain that merely lumber is being exported
from the country?95
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Even more serious charges have surfaced since then
in a report by the leftist forum.msk.ru newspaper. It alleges that the Russian government, operating through
the GRU led by General Valentin Korabel’nikov, put
together a decade-long program of clandestine weapons sales to Iran to keep Israel and Washington guessing as to Iran’s true capabilities. This gray and black
market program also enlisted the cooperation of the
governments of Algeria and Syria, the arms brokers
Viktor Bout and Munzer al-Kassar (who was arrested
in Spain in 2007 and since extradited to the United
States), and Russian organized crime figures in Spain,
along with members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) who have bases in Iran and engage regularly in
arms trafficking. In other words, Moscow orchestrated
a long-running program of illicit and clandestine arms
sales to Iran, involving terrorists, criminals, and complicit governments until the network began to break
down with the arrests of Kurdish contact Zakhar Kalashov, thanks to the efforts, among others, of Anatoly
Litvinenko who was murdered in 2006, probably by
Russian intelligence. That initial arrest led to other arrests, the breakup of the program, Algeria’s return of
Russian weapons, allegedly because they were defective, the sacking of General Korabel’nikov, the breakup of the network with the arrests of the two arms
brokers, and an abortive last attempt, using the Arctic
Sea to run weapons to Iran in 2009.96 If these reports
are true, they would represent the depths of corruption to which the arms trade has brought the government in its linkages with organized crime, also a fact
of life in the government’s energy business, and illustrate the dangers this trade poses to Moscow, and to
international security more generally.
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Since Iran then reexports these weapons, including possibly Shahab-3 missiles to other rogue states
like Syria or terrorist groups, this amounts to playing
with fire.97 This urge to play with fire and also to be on
both sides of the action in the Middle East is not new.
We have seen it earlier in Iraq. Before the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, Russia simultaneously sought partnership with Washington; a free hand at home, and in
the CIS against terrorists; and friendship with Iraq.
It was prepared to look the other way if Washington
took account of Russian interests in Iraq, more broadly the Gulf, and the CIS because those interests were
both economic and political and because they served
to enrich key political elites in Moscow and validate
Russia’s stance as a legitimate actor regarding Iraq’s
destiny beyond Russia’s membership in the United
Nations (UN) Security Council. Those interests included large debts of $7-8 billion, large-scale energy
contracts to develop Iraqi oil fields, large-scale trade
in Russian goods under the notoriously corrupt oil for
food program that, as we now know, enriched many
members of Russia’s top elite. Beyond that the Gulf
states in general were and are regarded by two of Russia’s most prominent lobbies after energy, defense industry, and the Ministry of Atomic Affairs (Minatom),
as fertile hunting grounds for large profitable sales.98
At the same time, Russian intelligence was furnishing Saddam with the results of Western conversations
about Iraq and running weapons to Iraq, again indicating Moscow’s desire to keep a foot in both camps.99
Meanwhile, for over a decade Moscow has been the
main provider of external support for Iran’s missile,
air defense, space, and navy programs.100 This cooperation goes back a long way. In 1998, Yevgenia Albats
outlined Russo-Iranian collaboration in helping Iran
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build nuclear missiles for use as a future intermediate
range ballistic missile (IRBM) to target Israel and Turkey. Iran also hopes to build an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to target the United States and Europe. Albats detailed the conscious participation and
coordination of Russia’s FSB, the State Commissions
on Non-Proliferation, and on Science and Technology,
Yevgeny Primakov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
probably the MoD in projects to send Russian scientists
to Iran to transfer nuclear know-how as Iran seeks to
develop IRBMs and then ICBMs.101 The large number
of Russian scientific-technological institutions helping
Iran develop its programs strongly suggests governmental involvement in coordinating this interaction,
especially as many of them either have close connections with the government, or are under its authority,
or claim to have informed the government of what
they were selling to Iran.102
The known technology transfers of WMD to Iran
involve production technology and testing of the
rocket engine for the SS-4 missile in violation of the
missile technology control regime (MTCR), the reactor at Bushehr, as well as the continuing exchange
of scientific know-how with Iranian scientists and/
or training in Russia for them.103 Because the SS-4 is
ineffective and inaccurate with small payloads, it
must have mass destruction payloads and capability
to be effective.104 The Bushehr reactor comprises four
reactors plus turbines that Russia is now expected
to provide along with more military technology and
weapons since Ukraine dropped out under U.S. pressure. All this assistance occurs even though Russian
officials know and publicly admit Iran is building
nuclear weapons.105 To be sure, Russia has clearly delayed indefinitely the completion of Bushehr, indicat-
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ing its knowledge of Iranian policy, but the record of
the past still stands. Indeed, the Russian press publicly
acknowledged that the Shihab-3 is built with the latest
Russian technology.106
Now the Russian government realizes it might
have a problem. Certainly, its armed forces understand that there is a growing Iranian missile, satellite,
and nuclear threat. Both Ivanov and former Chief of
Staff General Yuri N. Baluyevsky have acknowledged
Iran’s threats.107 Commenting on Iran’s launch in early
2007 of a sub-orbital weather rocket, Lieutenant General Leonid Sazhin stated that,
Iran’s launch of a weather rocket shows that Tehran
has not given up efforts to achieve two goals—create
its own carrier rocket to take spacecraft to orbit and
real medium-range combat missiles capable of hitting
targets 3,000-5,000 miles away.108

Sazhin also warned that Iran was thereby developing capabilities that could strike Russia and Europe
and trying to create its own missile carrier to orbit both
satellites and medium range-missiles.109 Although he
argued that this capability would not fully materialize for 3-5 years, it would also take at least that long
to test and deploy the American missile defenses that
are at issue. Likewise, Major-General Vitaly Dubrovin, a Russian space defense expert, said flatly “now
Tehran has a medium-range ballistic missile, capable
of carrying a warhead” and admitted that this threatens everyone, including Russia.110 Naturally both
men lamented Iran’s decision to validate U.S. threat
assessments.111 Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the
Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, admitted that one could not rule out that Iran’s nuclear
program may have a future military nature.112 Since
February 2007, Iran has developed the Ashura IRMB,
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with a 2,000 kilometer (km) range, and the Sajil solid
fuel missile with comparable range.113
By midsummer 2008, General Victor Yesin, First
Vice-President of the Security, Defense, and Law and
Order Academy, opined that by 2016-18 Iran might be
able to create ICBMs.114
Iran continues developing its program and, in the
very near future, we should expect that missiles with
a medium range of up to 4,000 kilometers will be created. The recently tested Shihab-3 missile is different
from Korean counterparts. Its engine has been developed by Iranian specialists. As regards intercontinental missiles, they will appear in Iran no sooner than
after eight-ten years.115

In August 2008, commenting on Iran’s launch of
the Safir missile, Moscow’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko decried “unwarranted”
speculation about Iranian space technology’s role in
its missile armaments. That speculation did not justify
the U.S. program since it was known that Iran already
had missiles with a capability of 2,000 km. He then
added that,
Within the framework of its space program, Iran is
preparing to launch a satellite to a low-altitude orbit.
A rocket has been built for this purpose and it is being
tested. The first test was held in February 2008, but, by
all accounts, failed to achieve the task set. The current
second rocket, according to Iranian mass media, was
a success, and a mock-up satellite was put into orbit.
If this is confirmed by space control means, Iran has
approached the stage of putting a satellite into earth
orbit, using its own launch vehicle.116

Thus Nesterenko, while denying it, confirmed
General Sazhin’s forebodings and threat assessment.
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Iran’s Omid satellite launch of February 2, 2009, also
confirmed Sazhin’s warnings.117 As a result of this
launch, Vitaly Lopota, President of Russia’s Energiya
Corporation, stated that Iran now has missiles capable
of reaching any spot on earth.118 Yesin now claims that
the fact that,
Iran has put a satellite with the Safir rocket—an upgraded and re-equipped version of the combat missile
Shihab-3M—is evidence that it has at its disposal a
medium-range missile, capable of delivering 100-150
kilogram payloads to a destination located 3,500-4,000
kilometers away. If the payload is increased at least to
1,000 kilograms—and this is a payload an intercontinental ballistic missile should be capable of carrying
quite easily—the range of the Iranian missile will inevitably reduce to 2,200 kilometers.119

He also stated that if Iran is assisted by other countries (and we know that it is receiving help from North
Korea if not from others—author), then, given the
progress its scientists have made, Iran, by 2014, will
be able to create its own ICBMs.120 Similarly, the U.S.
Institute for Foreign Policy Assessments reported in
late 2008 that,
Projecting Iran’s extant capabilities into the future, and
with an eye on how Iran’s nuclear force posture might
evolve, it is safe to say that Iran is likely to pursue
development of a serious long-range ballistic missile
capability, supported potentially by satellite guidance
technologies, perhaps to attain a limited counterforce
capability. Iran already is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and it is known to be
experimenting with multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technologies, using its spacelaunch program basis for some of this technology development.121
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And if we look at cruise missiles, against which
Russia has highly ineffective defenses, the picture of
Iran’s developing capabilities is equally sobering.122
Indeed, the Obama administration has already essentially repudiated the national intelligence estimate of
2007 and has concluded that Iran is unquestionably
seeking a nuclear weapon.123
Similarly, President Putin’s 2007 proposal for joint
use of the Gabala air and missile defense installation
in Azerbaijan implicitly acknowledged the validity of
the U.S. threat perception concerning Iran. As one Iranian newspaper wrote in September 2007,
Meanwhile, the change of stance by Russia regarding
the anti-missile defense shield, from criticizing it and
rejecting it to proposing the use of an alternative site
for that system, could be regarded as a remarkable
development that indicates the serious threats posed
by that project. In the case of the implementation of
a ‘joint missile defense system’ and the installation of
intercepting radar systems in our neighboring countries—the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, or Kuwait—would include the intensification of American
threats against our country.124

Thus Moscow clearly knows that Iran is building
ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500-4,000 km or
more that threaten Russia’s territory and vital interests, although they argue that it is only building them
in the tens, not hundreds, of missiles.125
Neither do potential problems end here. In 2009
Russian naval officiers were arrested in Kyrgyzstan
for trying to sell China restricted anti-ship missiles,
suggesting that, as in the case of the Arctic Sea, the officer corps has more than a few “entrepreneurs” in it
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who are willing to sell advanced weapons abroad for
money. In another example, i.e., Myanmar, Moscow’s
penetration of the local arms market was reportedly
effected not by the state or Rosoboroneksport (ROE),
but by Russia’s intelligence agencies, giving rise to
questions of whether or not the government has complete control over its arms sales to Myanmar, as those
should be conducted by ROE and the MoD.126 Given
Myanmar’s inclinations towards developing nuclear
energy and its close ties with North Korea, this might
not be the soundest policy from the standpoint of advancing Russian national interests.
Given the scope of rogue states’ efforts to obtain
the weapons and technologies they need or covet, the
consequences of this corruption can be dangerous not
only in terms of first-order effects, but also in terms
of second and third-order effects. Apart from the international consequences of such corrupt transfer of
arms to these states, the dangers to Russia are now
quite visible. Once again, the personal interests of
key government officials and agencies seem to be as
much drivers of policy as are allegedly geostrategic
and geopolitical considerations. And these personal
or sectoral considerations have clearly put Russian interests at some degree of risk either politically in Latin
America or, more dangerously, by placing Russia’s
territory and that of its CIS partners at a not insignificant risk from Iran.
Tandemocracy and Civil-Military Relations.
There can be little doubt that these instances of corruption in the arms sales realm derive, a least in part
from the pervasive corruption of the state that is intrinsic to its governance. But the state’s political structure
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also aggravates the many dangers its defective civilmilitary relations could pose for Russia. The current
tandemocracy of Medvedev and Putin offers significant potential dangers in this regard. It represents a
wholly manipulated show of legality and democracy
masking the legal nihilism designed to overcome the
true achilles heel of Russian politics, namely the succession question. But it has failed to do so because it
is already clear that the issue of the 2012 presidential
election provides a challenge that is almost impossible, if not impossible, to meet by truly democratic and
legal means. Evidently both Putin and Medvedev intend, as of now, to compete for the presidency, which
will threaten the equilibrium and lead to just that kind
of elite cleavage that could undermine this system.127
What we already know is that there appears to be,
if not a personal rivalry between Medvedev and Putin,
then certainly a policy struggle between their respective entourages. But this struggle is one where Putin
and his supporters, drawn like him from the Russian
power structures (Silovye Struktury) especially the old
KGB, have apparently prevailed until now. Although
there has been a lot of discussion about this rivalry
and its domestic policy implications, the potential repercussions for Russia’s foreign and domestic policies
are also quite serious.
Moreover, Putin clearly feels that, despite the constitution reserving defense issues to the President, he
can comment publicly on major defense issues and
throw his weight around on them, e.g., his December 29, 2009, comments on the impending nuclear
weapon treaty with the United States blaming the U.S.
missile defenses for the delay and demanding that
Russia build offensive weapons and insist upon the
United States linking defenses to offenses or getting
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rid of its missile defenses.128 Putin’s statements, when
compared to Medvedev’s anodyne comment that the
U.S. and Russian positions on the treaty were close,
indicate his desire to upstage Medvedev, show who
is boss, and play to the anti-American tendencies so
prevalent among many members of the elite. In other
words, he is conducting his own security policy.129 Not
only do Putin’s statements throw a monkey wrench
into the negotiations to conclude the treaty, he also deliberately impeded senatorial ratification of the treaty
and, as General (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, one of Russia’s leading experts, underscored, sought to maintain
the concept of mutual deterrence that presupposes
mutual hostility with the United States.130
This is by no means his sole obstruction of defense
and security policy. A recent article by Mikhail Zygar
laid out all the cases of foreign and defense rivalry.
The government of Nauru was evidently promised
$50 million by Putin’s team, not the regular government, to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Similarly Russia’s in and out again
stance on membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008-10 owes much to this rivalry,
which has obstructed a clear and coherent posture on
this issue. Instead, the Putin group tried to impose
a customs union, with Belarus and Kazakhstan all
entering together under Russian leadership into the
WTO. Putin also blocked the implementation of the
Northern Dimension transit route to bring supplies to
NATO forces in Afghanistan. Thus the bureaucracy,
especially the armed forces, is blocking the agreement,
and as of the end of 2009, there had been just two such
flights. Only afterward did full-scale commitment to
this route begin.131
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Putin had also insisted on dragging out the negotiations on arms control with the United States before
his speech, because he apparently wanted to “demonstrate that Obama received the Nobel Prize for nothing” and did not want the United States to chalk up
this agreement on offensive weapons to its credit. In
private conversations at the time, Russian diplomats,
who are powerless to stop Putin, admitted that the
treaty might be shelved altogether, and Foreign Minister Lavrov meanwhile charged that the United States
has refused to negotiate seriously. In the meantime,
governments in the CIS have begun to resist Moscow’s
pressure as its policies become more demanding and,
dare we say, chauvinist.132
Indeed the Russian press has recently commented
upon the appearance of friction as Medvedev acquires
leadership experience and greater international recogniton.133 The essence of the problem lies in the following situation.
Russia’s policy process is opaque and informal: the
highest authority, especially in matters of national security, is theoretically vested in the president. The current incumbent [Dmitri Medvedev] however, appears
to play second fiddle to the strongman prime minister
[Vladimir Putin], who skillfully balances interests of
powerful financial-industrial clans closely connected
to the machinery of the Russian state. This political
system produces endless intrigue and policy debates,
often without an obvious resolution and execution. 134

This press report cited three examples, but this
friction was already apparent in 2008. Once again,
Latin American policies are instructive in this context
for they show the same thing.
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This Latin American example illustrates that the
rivalry opens up areas for well-connected political entrepreneurs like Igor Sechin, acting on behalf of Putin,
to launch defense and foreign policy initiatives that
expose Russia to some risk and dangerous adventures and suggests that the military services are being
drawn into this game on one or another contender’s
side, a further example of politicization of the armed
forces and the increasingly risk-accepting behavior of
the Russian government. Displaying that strategic motivation to counter U.S. policy, President Putin, even
before the Georgian war of 2008, also seemed to be
trying to conduct his own security and foreign policy
in competition with his heir, President Medvedev, by
planting hints among military men that Russia should
restore its relations with Cuba and establish an air
base there. He even sent Deputy Prime Minister Igor
Sechin and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Cuba in 2008 to discuss enhanced cooperation
between the two states. Given Patrushev’s position as
Head of the Security Council, this could only mean
defense cooperation. Such moves clearly aimed to
irritate the United States gratuitously. Cuba refused
to bite because these plans were publicly announced
without consulting it in advance, further evidence that
they served interests other than that of Cuba.135 Cuba’s
Foreign Minister even denied any knowledge of the
Russian plan for deploying military sites there, and
Fidel Castro publicly praised Raul Castro’s restraint
in refusing to be provoked by Moscow or by U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz, who
said that such a base would be crossing the red line.136
But we cannot exclude further developments
along that line. Indeed, not only did Sechin promote
further economic deals and arms sales to Cuba, Ven-
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ezuela, and Nicaragua, he also discussed with them
the formation of an alliance, as “Moscow considers the
formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S.
activity in the former Soviet Union and the formerly
proposed placement of missile defenses in Poland
and the Czech Republic.”137 Not surprisingly, Sechin
reported to Putin that Moscow should upgrade its
relations with these countries in particular, and Latin
America in general.138 But if such an alliance does actually materialize, then, given its open military component and arms sales, it would pose a serious threat
to Latin American and U.S. interests.
In March 2009, it became clear that Moscow factions
were still trying to militarize ties to Latin America.
Lieutenant General Anatoly Zikharev, Commander in
Chief of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation, claimed that
President Chavez had offered the island of L’Orchila
as a temporary base for his forces, i.e., strategic bombers, and that Cuba could also serve such a purpose.
Chavez quickly backpedaled, saying that he had only
said Russian planes could land there if this fit into
Moscow’s plans. And Cuba again remained silent. Still
there are reports that Cuba has agreed to host a Russian satellite tracking station, which would represent
a Russian effort to recover something like what it used
to have at Lourdes before 2001.139 Obviously somebody in Moscow wanted to raise this issue of Latin
American bases, and the Air Force and Navy clearly
want such bases. But again the government quashed
the whole idea, and it has not been raised again.140
Nevertheless, it appears that Latin American policy is
an issue linking Chavez with Russia’s “hawks” and
Siloviki (members and politicians who are alumni of
the power structures, police, army, etc.) in the Russian
political struggle.
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The Russian media reports of significant differences in foreign policy also touch on sensitive defense
issues. Whereas Presidents Obama and Medvedev
agreed on the framework of an arms control treaty at
their July 2009 summit, Russian specialists, apparently
designated by Putin, began to insist on taking account
of not only U.S. but also United Kingdom (UK) and
French nuclear forces. This led Medvedev to try and
resolve outstanding issues in the negotiations with
Washington more quickly. Second, in regard to China
policy, Sechin, rather than Medvedev, appears to be
the main Russian foreign policy actor, and he has not
only an interest in Putin triumphing, but a personal
pecuniary interest as head of the Rosneft oil company
in China policy, suggesting that the fusion of personal
and political interests at the highest level continues
with deleterious effects for Russia regarding its ties
with China.
Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which Putin
(against the constitution) supervises, leaned hard on
Armenia to make concessions to Turkey in the recent
normalization process of 2008-09, making Medvedev
very unhappy about his exclusion from an active role
in that issue. Evidently what motivated Putin was
the desire to obtain Turkey’s assent to construction
of the proposed South Stream gas pipeline in its territorial waters in the Black Sea. While this objective
was attained, it clearly reflected the division between
Medvedev and Putin.141 Thus, this rivalry not only can
lead to consequential foreign and defense policies of
the utmost significance for Russia: ties with the United
States and Latin America, arms control, relations with
China, and ties to Turkey; it also fosters the politicization of the armed forces and rather risky efforts at
projecting power abroad.
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THE NEW DEFENSE LAW
The urge to project power abroad and take a tough
line with the United States for its own sake also merges in other ways with the legal nihilism cited above in
the new additions to the Law on Defense. For all its
talk of adhering to international law, Russia, in fact
does not recognize the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the states emerging after 1989 or its eastern
European neighbors as being full or immutable. At
the NATO-Russia Council in April 2008 in Bucharest,
Romania, President Putin told President Bush, “But,
George, don’t you understand that Ukraine is not a
state?” Putin further claimed that most of its territory was a Russian gift in the 1950s. Moreover, while
Western Ukraine belonged to Eastern Europe, Eastern
Ukraine was “ours.” Furthermore, if Ukraine did enter
NATO, Russia would then dismember Ukraine and
graft its parts onto Russia, and thus Ukraine would
cease to exist as a state.142 Putin also said that Russia
regards NATO enlargement as a threat, so if Georgia
received membership, Moscow would “take adequate
measures” and recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia
to create a buffer between NATO and Russia.143 As we
have seen since then, these were not idle threats.
Since then Medvedev has called upon the Duma
to pass a new law amending the previous Law on Defense, which it subsequently has done and which he
recently signed into law. Specifically he urged it to revise the existing laws to pass a new law,
The draft law would supplement Clause 10 of the Federal Law on Defense with paragraph 21 specifying that
in line with the generally accepted principles and pro-
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visions of international law, the Russian Federation’s
international treaties, and the Federal Law on Defense;
Russian Armed Forces can be used in operations beyond Russia’s borders for the following purposes:
-T
 o counter an attack against Russian Armed Forces
or other troops deployed beyond Russia’s borders;
-T
 o counter or prevent an aggression against another
country;
- To protect Russian citizens abroad;
-T
 o combat piracy and ensure safe passage of shipping.
The draft suggests that the Federal Law on Defence
be supplemented with Clause 101, setting, in accordance with Russia’s Constitution, the procedures for
decisions on use of Russian Armed Forces beyond the
country’s borders.144

Not only would this law provide a “legal” basis
for the offensive projection of Russian military force
beyond Russia’s borders, it would thus justify the war
of 2008 and any subsequent attack against Georgia in
response to alleged attacks on “the Russian citizens”
of the supposedly independent states of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. It also provides a basis for justifying the
offensive use of Russian force against every state from
the Baltic to Central Asia on the self-same basis of supposedly defending the “honor and dignity” of Russian
citizens and culture from discrimination and attack.
This whole episode also tells us that Medvedev’s instruction to the Duma indicated his awareness, even
if it remained implicit, that the war with Georgia was
illegal under Russian law at the time. This should not
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surprise us. After all, in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war, Medvedev announced that he would form
his foreign policy on five principles. Among them are
principles that give Russia a license for intervening in
other states where the Russian minority’s “interests
and dignity” are allegedly at risk. Medvedev also asserted that Russia has privileged interests with countries which he would not define, demonstrating that
Russia not only wants to revise borders or intervene in
other countries, it also demands a sphere of influence
in Eurasia as a whole.145 Here again, we see that legal
nihilism is directly linked to the threat of politicized
military action abroad on the flimsiest of bases.
In many respects the language of this new law contradicts international law and the UN’s language pertaining to relevant situations. As one Russian source
told the newspaper Kommersant, the president has received what amounts to “general power of attorney
independently to decide issues of the Russian military’s participation in operations outside Russia.”146
Beyond that,
Due to its vague and ambiguous wording, the new
Russian legislation has radically expanded the range
of circumstances under which Moscow considers it
legitimate to deploy troops abroad, as well as the list
of states in which Russia may station armed forces in
accordance with the law.147

Second,
The clause concerning the protection of Russian citizens in foreign states grants Moscow the right of unilateral military intrusion into any country in which
Russian citizens reside on a permanent or temporary
basis under a wide set of arbitrarily construed circum-
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stances. It does not specify precisely what ‘an armed
attack’ constitutes, how many Russian citizens need
to be under attack to justify Russian intervention,
whether such an attack would be carried out by armed
forces or law-enforcement agencies of a foreign state
or by non-state armed groups, and whether the Russian government has to obtain an official sanction to
act in a foreign territory from the UN Security Council
or from the authorities of the particular state where
Russian citizens are under attack. 148

Third, this law radically alters the security situation in the CIS because it gives Russia a legal platform,
so to speak, for justifying its unilateral intervention
into any of the other members’ territory that is not
provided for in the founding documents of existing
treaty organizations in the CIS and thus undermines
their validity and with it the protection of those other
states’ sovereignty and integrity. As Yuri Fedorov
writes,
Russia’s self-proclaimed right to defend its troops
against armed attacks affects Moscow’s relations with
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, all of which are parties to the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] and, with
the exception of Belarus, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization [SCO], and which also have bilateral arrangements on military assistance with Russia. Russian troops and military facilities are deployed in all
of these states, with the exception of Uzbekistan. Neither the Collective Security Treaty, nor any bilateral
arrangements imply Russia’s right to make unilateral
decisions about the form, scope and very fact of employing its forces in the aforementioned states. All of
these issues were to be decided either by all parties to
the CSTO collectively, or by parties to the corresponding bilateral treaty. Decisions on counter-terrorist
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activities in the framework of the SCO are made by
consensus. The new Russian legislation did not cancel
out the multilateral or bilateral decision-making procedures yet it devalued those procedures in a sense.
If Russian troops deployed in some of these countries
are involved in international or internal conflicts,
which is quite possible, Moscow will have a pretext
for using them and duly deploying additional units
in a unilateral manner. The right to defend Russian
troops on foreign soil is of particular importance for
Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Moldova. The
Ukrainian government has demanded the withdrawal
of the Russian naval base after 2017, while Moldova
insists on the immediate departure of Russian troops
from Transdniestria. In turn, Moscow has set its sights
on stationing its troops there indefinitely. In such a
context, skirmishes of any degree of gravity involving Russian servicemen in these countries may furnish
Moscow with a pretext for military intervention.149

Fourth, as Fedorov notes, this law directly contradicts the language of the draft treaty on European
security submitted by Medvedev to European governments on November 29, 2009.150 While that draft
treaty preaches multilateralism, the new law shows
that, “Moscow favors a unilateral approach towards
security issues and wants a free hand if and when
conflict situations arise.”151 Fifth, Medvedev wants to
free himself from any constraint of consultation with
legislative bodies over this decision. When the law
was passed in November 2009, he had to agree to a
proviso in the law that he had to consult with the Federation Council on the question of dispatching troops
abroad in these circumstances. But by December, he
was demanding unfettered power to make this decision unilaterally. In other words, we are coming to a
point where a president may send troops abroad for
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the vaguest of pretexts without any accountability
whatsoever. Legal nihilism only begins to describe
this situation. 152 Or, as Felgenhauer observes, this law
represents a constitutional coup.153
Finally and sixth, as Fedorov observes, this law
may also shed some light on Moscow’s thinking about
future power projection scenarios beyond its borders.
Specifically,
In particular, the Russian intelligence services may
plan to ignite disturbances and ethnic clashes in Sevastopol, resulting in attacks against the Black Sea Fleet
servicemen or facilities by criminal groups or an unruly mob. This would give Russia the legal grounds to
intervene militarily in the Crimean peninsula, occupy
Sevastopol or the whole peninsula and retain its naval
base for an indefinite period of time. Another scenario
presupposes the engineering of ethnic clashes in Estonia and/or Latvia, which may be exploited by Moscow as a pretext for military intervention, or at least
for the threat of such intervention. Widespread rioting
and looting in Tallinn in April 2007, provoked by the
decision to relocate the Soviet Army monument, yet
fuelled and orchestrated by Russian agents, confirmed
that Moscow has enough instruments at its disposal
to destabilize the situation in large cities in Latvia and
Estonia with a substantial proportion of ethnic Russians.154

Where the president has unchallenged power to
deploy forces at home or abroad the politicization of
the security sector in a condition of tandemocracy or
dual power (Dvoevlastie in Russian) is fraught with
danger for both foreign and domestic policy. Although the Putin era supposedly represented an era
of heightened control over policy, it is entirely plausible to argue that in fact the fissiparous tendencies
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that were so observable under Yeltsin have continued
and continue to challenge central policymakers.155 But
under conditions of this dual power these conflicts,
some of which we have already cited, have now openly emerged in the security sector.
For example, the importance of the Ministry of Interior and its forces (MVD and VVMVD) to the state
are incontestable. In fact, until relatively recently, the
bulk of spending on security went to them rather than
the armed forces, reflecting the government’s awareness that the primary threats were within, not external to Russia.156 However, the MVD is known to be
an extremely corrupt institution whose defects have
been seized upon in the recent scandal of the death
of the 37-year-old lawyer of Hermitage Capital, Sergei Magnitsky, in prison. This scandal has even led
to calls for a purge or even liquidation of the ministry in order to reform it.157 But behind the calls for a
purge or even liquidation of the ministry stand those
members of Medvedev’s entourage, allegedly led by
Vladislav Surkov, who seek to use this incident to
break down the MVD, which has been a stronghold of
the Putin faction and the Siloviki. Although they have
had limited success in forcing dismissals of some officials there for this scandal and other examples of malfeasance, like the explosion of an ammunition dump
in Ulyanovsk, in fact, they have not yet successfully
forced the wholesale purging of the MVD because, as
Alexander Golts wrote, the President cannot dismiss
the Minister, Rashid Nurglaiev, because he is not in
the president’s nomenklatura, the list of officials over
whom the president has power.158 Clearly, this attempt to further politicize the MVD is fraught with
extraordinarily dangerous potential consequences, for
such games may go on to embrace the army on critical
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foreign policy questions as we have already seen. And
the army’s politicization, as we also know, has long
since been approved from above.159
CONCLUSIONS
As Barany and Gomart, among others, have observed, civil-military issues and relations are not a
technical question but go to the heart of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy projects.160 The anti-democratic nature of those relations and the reliance of
both sides of this dyad on the incessant invocation
of foreign threats contribute in many ways to the fact
that Russia, as such, intrinsically remains a risk factor
and is so acknowledged by Russian analysts. Two last
points here are particularly relevant. First, Russia’s
numerous pathologies in the area of civil-military
relationship highlights the fact that the principles of
constructing the security sector under democratic conditions give rise to security and peace among states,
but that failure to do so breeds endemic, enduring,
and structural insecurity within states (in this case
Russia) and among their neighbors.161
Second, all the cases presented above point to the
fact that not only is Medvedev and his team unable
to control the discussion over the nature of threats
to Russia and the appropriate responses to them, but
that he clearly has imperfect control over the state and
overall security sector (i.e., the Silovye Struktury). Under conditions of the tandemocracy and the phenomena listed above, these facts again bring home to us the
fact that the intrinsic nature of Russia’s governmental
structure is the reason why it remains a perennial risk
factor in international security.162
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The persistence of an archaic, even neo-feudal,
structure of power that fuses power and property
under a political structure reminiscent of late Tsarism is itself impressive testimony to Russia’s fundamental instability, a fact that its leaders have also
always grasped. Yeltsin and Putin’s regressive steps
to institutionalize this system have paradoxically contributed to a situation where the President directly
confronts his military institutions without benefit of
a public body to enforce accountability, transparency,
and depoliticization.163 This does not mean a coup is
imminent, or even likely; indeed, neither alternative
is foreseeable anytime soon. Nor does it mean that
war is around the corner. But it does mean that both
wars and coups (whether by generals or by politicians
leading generals) remain ever present possibilities in
Russia. Consequently and owing in considerable measure to the system that has emerged, neither is Russia’s true security or that of its neighbors foreseeable
anytime soon. And that problem is an enduring one
that will not change until and unless Russia changes.
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CHAPTER 2
RUSSIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
IS THERE SOMETHING NEW WITH
MEDVEDEV?
Thomas Gomart
Civil-Military Relations (�������������������������
CMR) are never fixed forever. The balance between civil power and military
power has been at the core of political relations since
antiquity. How to guard the guards? In any country,
this balance is in a perpetual state of flux. That means
there are constant struggles, tensions, or adjustments
between both powers, given their close proximity and
their essentially different natures. This also means that
CMR are one of the best vantage points to observe the
leadership of any state with military forces.
In this regard, Russia is not unique. However, it
certainly has particular traits that should be taken
into consideration when analyzing these relations.
First, Russia has a long tradition as a great power.
CMR are deeply rooted in Russian strategic culture,
which mixes imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet legacies. Second, in the global nuclear balance, Russia is a
power comparable only to the United States in terms
of its capabilities. Third, Russia holds a permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Fourth, Russia intends to rebrand itself as one of the
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), as a geoeconomic player able to impact the global balance of
power.
Given the deep-rooted tradition of the personalization of power in Russia and the consistently sensitive relationship between the Kremlin and the secu-
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rity community (armed forces and security services)
in charge of protecting the country from both internal
and external threats, CMR are a key element of the
presidential leadership. In this field, Vladimir Putin’s
legacy after his two terms as president (2000-04 and
2004-08) is far from being insignificant. It is worth underlining three traits.1 First, in comparison with Boris
Yeltsin, Putin was seen by the security community as
a professional and the primus inter pares. Putin very
carefully established a new institutional balance within the security community with the effective involvement of the presidential leadership. Second, CMR
accurately reflected Putin’s personal power, both in
terms of its ambitions and its limitations. It is never
easy to implement a reform—a fortiori for the military
due to its esprit de corps. Added to this, Putin’s terms
were very often described as a period of dominance for
the so-called Siloviki, a strange mix of people coming
from the security services and the armed forces. This
ruling group is certainly more of a media construction
than a homogeneous group of servants loyal to Putin
or “Putinism.” Third, Russia’s great power status on
the international scene is fundamental to the identity
of the Russian elite. Moscow continues to promote a
foreign and a security policy based on the rationale of
Derzhavnichestvo (great power status). In other words,
Russia is either a great power, or it is nothing.
In this context, since his election in March 2008,
Dmitry Medvedev has faced the dramatic challenge
of positioning himself vis-à-vis the armed forces, the
security services, and his Prime Minister. In August
2008, the war in Georgia was his first high intensity
crisis. This war clearly marked a turning point for the
new Russian leadership, and reminds commentators
that analysing CMR in Russia is not always a purely
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academic pastime. At first glance, Medvedev’s own
position in CMR is quite uncomfortable. It is one thing
to deal with Putin’s legacy on CMR—in itself very
challenging for a young president unfamiliar with
the security community, its codes, and its practices/
habits—it is another to do so with Putin as Prime Minister. However, reform within the Russian security
community is ongoing, and its implementation has
proceeded apace in the course of 2009. This reform
has been largely unremarked upon by Western policymakers. Given Putin’s legacy and his current position,
as well as attempts to reform the military, two basic
issues deserve to be raised.
First of all, who is the primus inter pares? This is
not simply an institutional question, it is a question
of perception, and consequently of leadership. As any
journalist would remind us, the Russian eagle has two
heads. Consequently, we should ask: is there a coordinated, effective action coming from the current duumvirate, supported by Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, to consistently implement military reform?
To what extent is this political effort successful? In this
view, Lajos Szaszdi presents an interesting hypothesis
which deserves exploration, even if it is quite impossible to assess it precisely. Szaszdi identifies a heavy
presence of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
within the Russian military, which became visible in
1996 and was accelerated after 1999. This penetration
can contribute to explain the efficient implementation
of the reform within the armed forces.2
Secondly, in a more prospective view, is there a
possible evolution of Russian CMR model towards a
“pattern of political military partnership”? This notion has been developed by Yoram Peri to describe the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) before the war in Lebanon
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(2006) and the operations in Gaza (December 2008).
This concept is based on the assumption that armed
and security forces have become heavyweight players
in the running of state affairs and exert strong influence on international affairs. According to Peri, “the
model of political-military partnership that developed
in Israel at the end of the 20th century might well anticipate similar civil-military relations in democracies
throughout the 21st century.”3 While remembering
that Israeli CMR are specific, given the fact that Israel
has been at war since its creation, it is worth utilizing this model to compare Russian CMR with Israeli
ones, much more than with those models seen in most
Western democratic countries. Indeed, it is worth noting that every Russian president has been faced with
war: Yeltsin in Chechnya (1994-96), Putin in Chechnya
(1999-2008), and Medvedev in Georgia (2008). There is
no doubt that warfare is constitutive of Russian political leadership.
With these two questions in mind, our current understanding of Russian CMR should focus not only on
the functioning of the duumvirate, but also base itself
on observations inside and outside the security community. Comparison is required with external models
but also with Russian/Soviet historical patterns. In
this area, we are witnessing a period of methodological convergence, which could be exploited politically.
One the one hand, Western expertise has understood
that it makes no sense to strictly apply its own models
of democratic civilian control, as they were exported
to Central and Eastern Europe during the so-called
“transition,” to the complex realities of Russian experiences. Russian traditions of militarism continue to
shape the mind-set of the Russian security elites. On
the other hand, the Russian top brass has clearly as-
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similated many concepts and ideas coming from the
West (and from other countries such as Israel) about
CMR. Recent publications tend to illustrate that the
Russian military no longer holds a self-referential vision for the Russian security establishment.4 These
two trends may offer more opportunities to address
CMR issues when dealing with Russia.
In a July 2009 article, Dale Herspring explains how
military culture is crucial to understand and practice
CMR in polities such as Russia and the United States.5
Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin
and George Bush I, and Putin and George Bush II),
Herspring argues that there were strong deficiencies in terms of understanding military culture. This
chapter will not discuss Herspring’s convincing argument, but makes use of the three key factors identified by Herspring: executive leadership, respect for
military expertise, and the chain of command. These
three components are crucial to the establishment of a
“political-military partnership” as suggested by Peri.
I intend to use this framework to analyze the Russian
duumvirate, to identify recent evolutions, and to speculate that military culture as described by Herspring
is the indispensable glue for a partnership, which may
be under construction in Russia right now.
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
Advantages of the Duumvirate.
Because of his background as FSB Director and
Secretary General of the Security Council (and lastly
as Prime Minister), Putin was well-versed in security
matters when he was appointed, and soon after elected, president. He manifested his personal interest in
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security issues, which certainly, at that time shaped,
his vision of the world, and were the main determinant in his distribution of power. There is no doubt
that the Kremlin’s supremacy in decisionmaking on
security policy was reinforced under Putin.6 Nor is
there any doubt that foreign policy is subordinated to
security policy in the Russian case. In contrast to the
Yeltsin period, Putin’s Russia regained real freedom
of action on the international stage.7 This comeback
could be explained in different ways, but one of them
is the rebuilding of offensive military capabilities.8
In comparison, Medvedev appears to have been
very green in the security business. His lack of experience was seen as one of his most visible weaknesses
when he was competing with Sergey Ivanov to become Putin’s successor. In retrospect, this apparent
weakness seems to have been converted into a competitive advantage. His political basis was established
through his administrative capabilities, his links with
Gazprom, and his ability to promote so-called “national projects.” Thanks to them, in the media he appeared
more socially-oriented than security-oriented. Added
to this, Putin was sure not to welcome competition in
his master field. Due to their differences of origins and
style, this duumvirate covers a larger political spectrum than an association between Putin and Ivanov
would.
Under Medvedev, there has also been a change
in the legal possibilities for military force; by removing constitutional constraints on military intervention
abroad in November 2009, Medvedev has widened
the executive leadership’s options. Medvedev signed
a law allowing the president to decide on his own the
operational use of the Russian armed forces abroad, as
well as the number of troops deployed (Previously, as
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written in the 1993 Constitution, the Federation Council's approval was required before allowing or disallowing use of force.).
Another very important point is that the cabinet,
headed by the Prime Minister, carries responsibilities
for Russian external relations. Unlike his predecessors
as prime minister, Putin clearly maintains a heavy
hand in security policy.9 Given his experience as president, Putin understands perfectly well the impact of
this security policy on Russian foreign policy, and the
need to promote them to both the Russian public and
Russia’s foreign partners. It is the first time since 1991
that Russia has had such a powerful Prime Minister,
who is acting more as a highly influential Vice-President rather than as the boss of ministers. This leads to
the conclusion that, acting together, this duumvirate
can exert strong pressure on the Russian security establishment given its internal popularity and its external contacts.
Dealing with War.
As has already been noted, since the collapse of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Russian leadership, from Yeltsin to Medvedev, has had
to deal with armed conflict. War is closely linked to
leadership in Russia. To some extent, it can be said
that every Russian leader should be tested at war before being fully recognized as a full-scale president.
War seems to be an implicit step in the cursus honorum.
The second war in Chechnya is crucial to understand Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000. In
fact, he demonstrated his appetite for military leadership when he was still Prime Minister. The decline of
Yeltsin’s political influence combined with the mili-
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tary’s desire for revenge and the divisions at the top
of the security community gave Putin some room to
show his resolution.10 In fact, when Putin acceded to
power, he exploited the political vacuum left by Yeltsin in the security field. Yeltsin “was not interested in
armed forces,” and created an incomplete presidential
leadership that affected the High Command.11 Putin
never considered Chechnya to be an ethnic conflict,
but rather a conflict between civilization and barbarians. From the start, he made no distinction between
terrorists and separatists, using the “international terrorism” concept as a way to establish his leadership
internally and to brand his image externally. On this
very last point, Chechnya was a field for various critics coming from abroad (mainly from Europe) but also
a field to promote himself as a tough leader (terrorists
should be “shot in the outhouses”). On the conduct
of operations, he was very careful in dealing with the
“Chechen generals,” taking time to insist on the need
for cooperation between the armed forces and the security forces. In short, Chechnya has been the main
tool used by Putin to implement his leadership internally.
The problem with Georgia is different, given the
fact that this war was conducted outside the Russian
Federation. From this point of view, Georgia is a very
telling case study for the implementation of leadership externally. It is too early to know if Medvedev
would have preferred to do so only diplomatically.
However, it is worth remembering that he took his
first main initiative in foreign policy in May 2008 by
promoting his ‘initiative’ for a new pan-European security architecture. Three months later, Russia was at
war with Georgia, and Moscow severely damaged its
relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO) and the European Union (EU). The “disproportionate use of force” figured among the numerous
criticisms of Russian behavior by Western officials in
the aftermath of the war. On September 1, 2008, the
EU condemned Russia for this reason. Many Russian
officials seemed unable to understand this condemnation conceptually.12 This lack of understanding can
be explained by the differences in the language of
leadership between both sides. In the West, generally
speaking, the concept of leadership is mainly seen as
the judicious use of management tools. In the business sphere, leadership is the means to make an organization or group to move in a chosen direction. John
Keegan points out that “modern economists preach
moderation.” Indeed, self-control and moderation are
very often presented as key factors of success in the
management literature. In Russia, generally speaking,
the concept of leadership remains security-oriented.
The important point to highlight is that, as Keegan
reminds us: “there is no place . . . for moderation in
warfare.”13 In Russian strategic culture, the only concern is final victory, an end which is justified, even if
it can only be won by means of extreme ruthlessness.
Therefore, Russian officials believe that Russian forces
calibrated the use of force in Georgia pretty well: “another option would have been to use the same methods as NATO in Serbia.”14
From this point of view, the real challenge for the
executive leadership is more internal than external: it
is to offer the military the proper political conditions
and framework to use force in pursuit of the state’s
objectives. Seen from outside, some decisions may appear irrational when, in fact, they are quite rational
in the Russian context, owing to the particular interface between the political and military leaderships.15
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In Chechnya, Putin gave the security community opportunities to operate with a free hand, as if his background makes him tolerant to violence. In addition,
Putin is convinced of the need to use force to be respected internationally. For the Russian leadership,
international respect chimes with fear. It is too early
to know whether Medvedev was a moderating factor
in Georgia. However, in terms of executive leadership, there was apparently a division of labor between
the Prime Minister and the President. The latter was
mainly involved in the diplomatic phase of the conflict, moving away from military confrontation by
negotiating the ceasefire. It can be said that the executive leadership based on the duumvirate was efficient
and successful in conducting the military operations
and attaining its political objectives. It was also lucky.
In fact the degree of success is relative. The Russian
military success was mainly due to the Russian armed
forces’ numerical superiority.16 In this way, the military leadership succeeded in compensating for its inferior equipment and training failures by managing
its numerical advantage. In the diplomatic field, the
success is much more debatable, given the fact that the
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia isolated
the Russian Federation on the international scene, and
will inhibit its capacity for initiative in foreign policy
for many years.
Crisis Management.
The sinking of the Kursk in August 2000 was the
lowest point of the Russian military’s decline, it was
also the first real test for Putin. In terms of domestic
crisis management, it was a complete disaster. The accident revealed the troubled state of CMR 1 year af-
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ter Putin took over from Yeltsin and gave an insight
into Putin’s style of leadership when dealing with the
military.17 On this occasion, Putin realized the duplicity of the high command and became determined to
reinforce his control over it. He did so, however, very
carefully, avoiding direct confrontation with the military. The sinking revealed the reluctance of the top
brass to deal openly with an accident and to accept
foreign help. Interestingly, this event was not at all
used against the military, particularly not the navy.
Given his political weakness at that time, the young
president avoided tackling the High Command head
on (despite many reasons to do so), but attributed the
disaster to the very poor state of the armed forces.
Consequently, the Kursk led to the decision to increase
the military budget significantly, even when the Russian economy was still very weak. In retrospect, the
sinking of the Kursk offers a case study of executive
leadership amid adverse conditions. The circumstances of the sinking and failed rescue operation are not
significant; the point is that Putin gave political meaning to the accident in order to tighten his grasp on the
military.
The second crisis managed by Putin was the Beslan
hostage taking in September 2004. It is the main turning
point in Putin’s double term, prompting both external
and internal changes. The event was in itself a trauma
for the both the leadership and the public. It has certainly been underestimated by the Western expertise,
given the fact that it occurred in a context where the
Russian security policy was already becoming more
assertive. However, this event profoundly affected
Russian domestic policy (it was used to justify administrative restructuring, probably decided upon before
the crisis) as well as security policy.18 According to
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Putin, “international terrorism,” to which Russia had
been subjected, should be eradicated by all means and
firstly by the reinforcement of the state. It was also
used as the main conceptual tool to force the security
community, and firstly the armed forces, to reconsider their priorities, organization, and doctrine. In fact,
Putin used Beslan to change the hierarchy of threats.
He explicitly disassociated Beslan from Chechnya by
presenting the hostage taking as an attack of “international terrorism” and claiming that Russia was facing
a “total, cruel, war on a large scale.” It is significant
to note the conflation of a classical understanding of
interstate power relations and a transnational reading
of mass terrorism. Putin used this crisis to redesign
the threat perception system. It was crucial to do so in
order to justify the military reform.
At present, Medvedev has not yet had to deal
with a crisis involving CMR. It is, for instance, too early to draw political conclusions from the bombing of
the Nevsky Express in November 2009. However, in
terms of executive leadership Medvedev seems to be
in line with Putin, underlining transnational threats to
justify and impose military reform.
RESPECT FOR MILITARY EXPERTISE
Use of Force and Utility of Force.
Apparently, Rupert Smith was not read only in
the West:19 The Russian leadership is quite well acquainted with the paradigm of war among the people.
According to Herspring,20 Putin, when he was Prime
Minister, “made it clear to the generals that he was
interested in their ideas on the use of force.” Even if it
was politically risky, Putin approved plans prepared
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by his high command, especially in the North Caucasus. In his thinking, there is a strong link between
military objectives and political achievements in order
to reestablish federal authority. However, this personal interest for the use of force led to strong debates
regarding the North Caucasus between the armed
forces, the FSB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) about the means to adopt. There were not only
debates on the nature of the Chechen war itself, but
also a more technical approach on the best tools to be
used to fight terrorists among a civilian population.21
In Putin’s understanding of the use of force, there
is also his personal experience from Kosovo. When
NATO hit Serbia in 1999, he was head of the FSB.
Externally, Kosovo convinced him of the necessity of
reconsidering Russia’s security policy.22 Internally, at
that time the Russian army’s reputation was suffering from its poor performance in Chechnya. For the
Russian top brass, the crisis in the Balkans offered “an
opportunity for redemption.”23 In June 1999, the decision by the military to take Pristina airport with 200
paratroopers revealed the dysfunctional CMR and the
high tensions between the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
From Putin’s point of view, this event and these tensions were very damaging for Russia’s credibility as
a player in the Balkans. The future president learned
an important lesson: The military did not hesitate to
take the initiative irrespective of the country’s official
diplomatic position. In other words, the respect for
military expertise should be complemented with the
military’s respect for and obedience to the president.
As president, Medvedev also allowed the military
to use force in Georgia. Even if there were some operational deficiencies, the Russian forces achieved vic-
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tory.24 This was particularly significant to the Russian
leadership as a whole, given that the Georgian army
was receiving American and Israeli aid. More important, Russia can proclaim a military victory in Caucasus after many years of frustration in Chechnya. This
intervention in the Georgian land provoked public debates in Russia over the use of force, and consequently
the possible role of the military as an instrument of
Russian foreign policy. This debate is not only about
political and constitutional constraints on military
intervention abroad, but also about the possibility of
increasingly frequent use of force in international relations in the future, as seen by the Russian leadership.25
From this point of view, there is clearly a link between
these debates and the notion of “sphere of special
interests” promoted by Medvedev.26 Regarding the
current president’s respect for military expertise, the
situation has changed in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, celebrating victory and achievement of the operational goals set by the Kremlin has not dispelled
“an atmosphere of uncertainty concerning the future
of Russia’s conventional forces.”27 Not an expert on security matters himself, Medvedev immediately used
this victory to pressure the High Commend to focus
on the modernization of the armed forces, in terms of
equipment and personnel structures.
Two Interconnected Tools: Reform and Budget.
After his election, Putin started to push the military to become a professional force. It was a risky task
as the High Command was very reluctant to professionalize. The reform promoted by Putin and mainly
implemented by Ivanov targeted several objectives.
First, the design of the military forces needed to be

90

redefined so as to create compact and mobile forces
that were able to be deployed abroad. This wish was
due to different threat analysis, which highlighted requirements other than the traditional risk of interstate
confrontation. Second, the reform was a means to reduce the social power of the conscription-based military. The conditions for personnel within the ranks is
certainly one of the most sensitive issues for Russian
public opinion. Last, but not least, the reform was a
way for the “civilian” leadership (both Putin and Ivanov) to gradually dominate the High Command. Ultimately, Putin and Ivanov were clearly determined
to lead a reform extending beyond the dismissal of
the most emblematic figure of the military institution. Both men marked “their joint will to rebalance
the civil and military spheres to the benefit of civilian
leadership with close ties to the security services.”28
In retrospect, it is interesting to analyze the parallel
careers of Ivanov and Medvedev, who were competitors, especially during Putin’s second term. Military
reform was Ivanov’s main political instrument for
self-promotion. He was successful in consolidating his
influence as deputy prime minister (November 2005),
and afterwards as first deputy prime minister (February 2007). Given these promotions and a background
similar to that of Putin (which, in fact, may have been
a disadvantage), there were high expectations that
Ivanov would succeed Putin. However, Ivanov’s
achievements were seen as less significant than Medvedev’s success in other areas through the so-called
“national projects.”
However, three key successes can be attributed to
Ivanov: (1) the dismissal of General Anatoli Kvashnin,
(2) the reestablishment of the Ministry of Defense at
the top of the military chain of command, and (3) his
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own succession by a real civilian minister.29 There is
a clear continuation between Putin and Medvedev:
the use of reform as a political tool to make the military change. Putin started the process with a disaster
(Kursk) while Medvedev has continued with a military success (Georgia). It is certainly easier to put pressure on the top brass after having satisfied its thirst
for prestige. On September 2008, Medvedev gave five
priorities: (1) permanent readiness for troops, (2) efficiency of the command system, (3) improvement of
training, (4) new weapons, and (5) social conditions.
This very ambitious reform was announced in the aftermath of the war before the Russian economy really
began suffering from the worldwide financial crisis.
The situation completely changed 18 months later in
that Russia was in deep recession in 2009 (gross domestic product [GDP] fell 8.5 percent). In this context,
the good news is that Medvedev, Putin, and Serdyukov are acting in the same direction by using the topic
of reform to dominate the military; the bad news is
that the financial constraints are tight, and limit the
potential for deep reform.
Born in 1962, Serdyukov seems to have a talent for
discretion as well as efficient reform within the armed
forces.30 He has no military experience except his time
as a conscript. His reform effort is supported by both
sides of the duumvirate, and Serdyukov has first of all
increased his control on the budget to make the top
brass change. In April 2009, Liubov Kudelina, Deputy
Defense Minister in charge of finances, left the Ministry of Defense (MoD); she was originally appointed
by Sergei Ivanov. In June 2008, following a dispute
over proposed cuts to the officer corps, Serdyukov
evicted Alexandr Rukshin, former chief of the MoD’s
Main Operations Directorate. The same month, the
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head of the General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky left
his position. Serdykov’s attempts to extend military
purchases beyond Russian industry provoked strong
reactions not only from the national monopolies, but
also from the Parliament.31
Serdyukov’s actions to increase control over the
military budget have generated consistent complaints
from the top brass and from the defense industry. He
is very often presented as an inexperienced civilian
minister, unable to deal with operational challenges.32
However, Serdykov persevered on the path of reform,
and announced a radical break in October 2008 just
after the war in Georgia. The General Staff and its
autonomy were clearly targeted for reduction, with
13,500 of its 22,000 positions slated for elimination.33
The General Staff is in charge of strategic planning.
Regaining political responsibility for this task is one
crucial justification for the reform and the redesign of
the armed forces. Since the departure of Baluyevsky,
the General Staff has been run by General Nikolai Makarov, whose prominent task in the reform process
has seemed to deflect criticism from his immediate
civilian boss.
CLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND
At the Top Level.
Having observed the very negative consequences
of an unclear chain of command under Yeltsin, given
the constant bickering between Igor Sergeyev and
Anatoly Kvashnin, Putin gradually used his authority
to silence their disputes. The fight between the MoD
and the General Staff not only damaged the image of
the military establishment, but also damaged the op-
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erational efficiency of the chain of command. It was
one of the most obvious conclusions of the first war
in Chechnya. At the beginning of the second war in
Chechnya, Putin gave his generals a free hand in conducting operations at the expense of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD). However, Putin’s initial trust
in his generals progressively changed given their tendency to openly ignore the political leadership when
fixing military objectives. In 2004, the dismissal of
General Kvashnin shifted the gravitational center of
the presidential administration/General Staff/MoD
to the benefit of the ministry. This led Putin to reinforce the FBS’s responsibilities, not only in Chechnya.
The gradual concentration of power around the
presidency under Putin gave him much more influence in strategic decisionmaking and planning. Putin
and his team supervised the designation of political
objectives and discussion with the High Command
of related military objectives. Under Putin, Chechnya was at the core of politico-military relations, and
clearly the level of coordination between politico-military interfaces improved significantly. This was due to
Putin’s personal leadership and the use of the threat of
international terrorism to justify new approaches and
new forms of organization.
In fact, the key issue remains threat perception at
the highest level and its translation into strategic planning. As already discussed, Medvedev used the war
in Georgia as the main tool for pursuing reform. He is
convinced that this reform can be best accomplished
within the context of a successful military campaign.
In terms of threat perception, Medvedev now has to
combine a set of complex processes: evolutions in the
relationship with the United States (including Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), the new NATO Strategic
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Concept, Afghanistan, and Iran), evolutions in the
relationship with China, experience drawn from the
war in Georgia, the continuing instability in North
Caucasus, and terrorist operations such as the Nevsky
Express bombing.
Small wars are always present, big war is still always possible: here is the discourse promoted to maintain the system and to justify the current power organization based on a large security community able to
exert a strong social influence on society and to project
it on the political leadership. This dual-track influence
is fuelled by an old-fashioned conscription system
related to an old-fashioned threat perception system.
The latter has fixed the Russian homeland as encircled
by adversaries, namely Western countries. At the end
of Putin’s first term, it was often estimated that the
Russian military threats were formulated mainly by
the military intelligence Russian Special Forces (GRU)
in the framework of the High Command.34 The political decline of the High Command and the changes in
the organization of the GRU may have changed these
habits. However and whatever the recent evolutions
are, it is worth noting that in its political communication “the regime has waged 10 different ‘wars’” over
the last 5 years.35 In other words, war is a discourse
used by the Russian leadership well beyond military
affairs. Such a discourse echoes pretty well with the
traditions of militarism deeply rooted in the different
levels of Russian society.
Recent decisions and statements cannot be properly
understood without taking these traditions of militarism into consideration. Even if there is a political wish
to reform and to modernize the armed forces, there
is strong resistance from the military establishment,
which is very capable, not only in Russia, of protect-
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ing its institutional interests. However, it seems that,
right now, there is much more agreement between the
top brass and the political leadership, simply because
the latter is more powerful. Given the experience of
Kvashnin and Baluyevsky, the current Chief of the
General Staff, Nikolai Makarov presents himself and
his institution as supportive of the reform. He denies
that “opposition from the generals” continues to present a barrier to the reform of the military.36 In the discourse at least, there is a consensus for pursuing the
reform according to the direction given by the political leadership. This reform is now a must for Medvedev and Putin, given the fact they perceived the war
in Georgia as a setback to their efforts of projecting
the image of a resurgent Russia.37 In other words, the
success or the failure of the reform will have a direct
impact on the diplomatic stance of the Russian Federation in the coming years.
New Design and Reshuffle.
Under Putin, Russia’s political leadership succeeded in reestablishing itself at the top of the chain of
command. This was achieved gradually, and not forever. In fact, CMR are continually in flux and largely
depend on the domestic context as well as the conduct of operations. Medvedev has the benefit of Putin’s legacy, even if he is constantly under pressure to
demonstrate his leadership in this particular field. The
reform is driven by the wish to redesign the military
organization in different sectors. For instance, special
attention is paid to the MoD information services,
which were overhauled in October 2009: many positions are no more reserved exclusively for officers, but
open to civilian experts.38
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The armed forces are divided into three main services (army, navy, and air force) and three separate
branches (strategic forces, space forces, and airborne
forces). One of the main efforts for reformatting focuses on the ground forces. The four-tiered command
system (military district-army-division-regiment) is
supposed to be replaced with the three-tiered system
(military district-army-brigade). These attempts require strong political and financial resources, given
the need to close down many units and consequently
to remove thousands of command positions. The aim
is to make the forces more mobile in order to improve
their capabilities of projection and increase the level
of readiness. They have deep consequences in terms
of education and training. On this last point, it is said
that command should be now more focused on the individual skills of officers and troops. The main target is
to improve the capabilities on the tactical level, having
in mind the evolution of many European armies. In
terms of command at this level, it is worth noting the
opening of the new noncommissioned officer (NCO)
training centre at Ryazan in December 2009. Russian
ground forces are asked to significantly improve their
modularity, mobility, and operational self-sufficiency.
This type of reform requires a strong political hand
and an ability to mobilize key military executives,
while removing reluctant ones. From this point of
view, many appointments (and dismissals) related to
these changes of structures have occurred recently. In
terms of figures, there is apparently a wave of change.
The officer corps is supposed to be reduced by 205,000
in 2016 (initially in 2012). In addition, there are very
brutal changes at the highest level of the military: for
instance, of the 50 top military officials, it is estimated
that 44 have been replaced since February 2007.39 For
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the reform and the proper balance in CMR, a key factor remains the position of the security services, which
have very recently exerted a disproportionate influence in comparison with other armies.
The fight between the GRU and the KGB-FSB has
been characteristic of Russian CMR for a long time.
This tension between the military intelligence structure and the civilian security services (also responsible
for monitoring the officer corps) is rooted in the past
totalitarian power structure. Some consequences are
still visible. To some extent, the recent developments
of the reform process have consisted in subjecting the
High Command, and consequently the GRU, which
played a crucial role in the strategic planning and in
the control of special forces, to the political leadership.
In April 2009, Korabelnikov, head of the GRU,
was removed. In terms of command, special forces
were removed from the control of the GRU and reassigned to the military districts: “It seems that the FSB
is now close to victory in the long-running competition for power and influence between the civilian and
military intelligence agencies.”40 This assessment deserves to be observed in the medium term, but if it
is confirmed, it is certainly a key step in the reform
process.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the initial question: Is there something new with Medvedev in terms of CMR?—I would
answer no and yes. No, given the fact that there is a
visible continuation of the reforming trend launched
by Putin in imposing the political leadership’s control
of the military leadership. This effort achieved many
concrete results. Both men are convinced by the need
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to transform the security community and the armed
forces into a more professional, compact, and mobile
instrument. Military expenditure has increased significantly over the last 10 years. It should continue to
allow the procurement of new weapons (also abroad)
and improve the level of training. At the same time,
control of financial resources remains the political
leadership’s main tool to make the High Command
change.
Yes, given the fact that CMR are always in flux, and
need to be adapted to circumstances. Medvedev did
so quite smartly. In fact, there was an apparent acceleration of the reform process after the war in Georgia.
This war highlighted numerous flaws in the conduct
of operations as well as the level of equipment. However, Russian forces were victorious, creating a much
more comfortable framework to implement reform.
In any case, threat perception remains at the core of
CMR for the coming years. On this also, changes will
not necessarily follow a linear path. The reform of the
armed forces remains a risky challenge for the Russian
leadership, and for its foreign counterparts.
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